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If A and B perform independent concurrent acts of negligence each
sufficient to injure C, who suffers an indivisible harm as a result,
traditionally C can collect damages from either A or B, as C chooses.! If
A pays a disproportionate share of C's damages, then A may assert rights
of contribution to compel B to reimburse A up to B's proportional share of
C's damages.
If A and B independently concurrently breach contracts, each breach
being sufficient to injure C, who suffers an indivisible harm as a result,
ought the same rules apply?
In the absence of a specific agreement of the parties,2 there are four
plausible solutions to allocating losses occasioned by concurrent breach of
contract. One might:
I) excuse both breaches on the ground that in each case the other breach
is a supervening cause of the plaintiff's harm;
2) import tort notions of joint and several liability;
3) impose apportioned (several but not joint) liability; or
4) identify the more responsible breacher, hold it for the full damages
and excuse the other.
* Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, California. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1981; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1985. I gratefully acknowledge the fine research
assistance of Gabriel Gregg, UCLA School of Law, Class of 1996 in connection with this Article and
the financial support of the UCLA Academic Senate and UCLA School of Law Dean's Fund.
1. Tort joint and several liability rules apply not only to tortfeasors whose acts are sufficient
causes, but also in the far more common case of necessary, but not sufficient, causes of indivisible
harms. This Article focuses on the case of multiple sufficient causes, sometimes referred to as the
problem of "alternative causes." H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 249-53 (2d
ed. 1985). As discussed infra notes 42-53, there is considerable variation in tort rules of contribution.
Moreover, traditional joint and several liability in tort has recently been limited in a variety of ways in
many American jurisdictions. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. Pending federal legislation
would preempt state joint and several liability rules for noneconomic damages in all cases affecting
interstate commerce. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1995) (a bill to enact the Common Sense
Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995).
2. See infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
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Each of these solutions is flawed, but I suggest that the fourth alternative,
which I refer to as the "one-party rule," is, on balance, the least flawed,
and, moreover, is logically connected to established contract law doctrine
concerning supervening events.
I was led to the problem of concurrent breach by a 1986 decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, California &
Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc.3 The C&H case, reminiscent of an
earlier Fifth Circuit case,4 raises the problem of concurrent breach in the
context of interlocking construction contracts that independently provide for
liquidated damages against each contractor in the event of delay. Because
I examine concurrent breach initially in the context of this liquidated
damages case, the analysis is necessarily intertwined with unique aspects
of liquidated damages.
The basic analysis, however, is ultimately applicable to the more general
case of concurrent breach as well. Several reported cases, generally
involving construction contracts or shipping contracts, raise similar issues
outside the context of stipulated damages.5 Although I have not tested the
3. 794 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986), amended and reh'g denied, 811 F.2d 1264, cert. denied, 484
U.S. 871 (1987).
4. Massman Construction Co. v. City Council of Greenville, 147 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1945)
(holding liquidated damage clause for delay in completion of bridge unenforceable on account of
neighboring state's failure to timely complete adjoining road).
5. See, e.g., In re Merritt Logan Inc., 901 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1990) (imposing joint and several
liability for damages to supermarket operator (including lost profits) on account of concurrent breaches
of warranty and acts of negligence by vendor, manufacturer and installer of defective refrigeration
equipment); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Suwanee River Spa Lines, 866 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1989)
(declining to reach issue of proper allocation of liability between the defendants, including question of
joint and several liability, when an improperly mated tug-barge sank off the Azores and improper
mating constituted independent breaches of separate contracts by the shipbuilder and the naval
supervisor); Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. MIV Bodena, 829 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding freight
forwarder who was obliged to obtain "clean bill" of lading and carrier who was obliged to stow cargo
below deck jointly and severally liable for damage to cargo stowed on deck pursuant to nonconforming
bill of lading); L.R. Foy Constr. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., Civ. A. No. 86-2136, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2842 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 1988) (rejecting joint and several liability for breaches of
independent implied contracts but finding that nonsettling defendant nevertheless entitled to pro tanto
set-off of settling defendant's cash payments on FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) motion); Alabama Football, Inc.
v. Greenwood, 452 F. Supp. 1191 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (excusing professional football player from
performance under contract with team because of prior termination of franchise by league); Turfinasters,
Inc. v. Tri-County Tree & Turf, Inc., No. 12166, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1143 (Mar. 21, 1991) (finding
no joint and several liability for independent breaches of separate contracts); Coke v. Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Co., 258 N.W. 257 (Mich. 1935) (finding no joint liability for independent breaches by
separate defendants that combined to cause warping of bowling alleys; "[tihe danger that plaintiff may
not recover in separate actions because the defendant in each suit successfully may cast the blame on
the other does not outweigh the difficulty in the single action of attaining justice . .. ."); Northern
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one-party rule by an in-depth application to each of these cases, the rule
can at least be plausibly applied to these cases as well.6 In addition,
parallels can be readily drawn to lines of cases involving concurrent
breaches of contractual and noncontractual duties in the collective
bargaining area,7 and tortious interference with contractual relations.8
This Article proposes an appropriate "default" rule. In the event that the
Petrochemical Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 211 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1973) (holding single injury
rule creates joint and several liability for concurrent breach) (see discussion infra text accompanying
notes 34-40); Lithia Lumber Co. v. Lamb, 443 P.2d 647 (Or. 1968) (finding no joint and several
liability for independent breaches of separate contracts); Campbell County Bd. of Educ. v. Brownlee-
Kesterson, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding architect, general contractor, and
subcontractors jointly and severally liable for contract breaches resulting in leaky roof).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 130-37.
7. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), and Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212
(1983), are leading cases involving concurrent breach of an employment contract by the employer and
of the duty of fair representation by the labor union. Bowen holds that in such "hybrid" cases, the
breach of the duty of fair representation ordinarily cuts off the employer's liability for breach of
contract. Thus, the contract damage claim of a unionized employee against his employer for wrongfil
termination is limited to the point when the union, had it not breached the duty of fair representation,
would have been able to win reinstatement of the employee. This rule has the effect of placing all the
liability for damages during the period of concurrent breach on the union. Cases following Bowen find
the union and the employer jointly and severally liable when the union, in addition to breaching the
duty of fair representation, also colludes with the employer in the employer's initial breach of contract.
See, eg., Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1474-75 (10th
Cir 1993); Bennett v. Local Union No. 66, Glass & Allied Workers Int'l Union, 958 F.2d 1429, 1140-
41 (7th Cir. 1992); Allen v. Allied Plant Maintenance Co., 881 F.2d 291, 299 (6th Cir. 1989).
Thus, somewhat counterintuitively, when the union is more heavily implicated in the wrongful
conduct, the employer has greater liability. Of course, this line of cases explicitly relies on federal labor
policy, not ordinary principles of contract law. Bowen, 459 U.S. at 220 ("[A] collective bargaining
agreement is much more than traditional common law employment terminable at will. Rather, it is an
agreement creating relationships and interests under the federal common law of labor policy.'). But
these results are consistent with my suggestion that the appropriate result is joint liability for joint
breach of a single obligation, but one-party liability (placed on the more responsible party) for
concurrent breach of independent obligations. Bowen is criticized in 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 999, at 26 (Supp. 1994) ("[Bowen's] holding must be seen as, at best, unfortunate.').
8. Some courts hold the tortious interferer jointly and severally liable with the contract breacher.
See. e.g., Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't See. v. Jefferson Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d 227, 233 (5th Cir.
1986); Stauffer v. Fredericksburg Ramada, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (E.D. Va. 1976) (finding basis
for imposing joint and several liability is breacher's participation in the tort, not liability on the
contract); Designs for Vision, Inc. v. Amedas, Inc., 632 So. 2d 614, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
Ross v. Holton, 640 S.W.2d 166, 173 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Armendariz v. Mora, 553 S.W.2d 400,406
(Tex. Civ. App.), writ refused n.r.e. (1977); Worrie v. Boze, 95 S.E.2d 192, 198 (Va. 1956). But see
Applied Equip. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1994) (holding that contract
breacher is not jointly and severally liable with tortious interferer); Hunter v. Board of Trustees of
Broadlawns Medical Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510, 519 (Iowa 1992) (imposing several liability only).
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parties themselves allocate liability for concurrent breach,9 ordinary
contract law principles call for enforcement of that allocation.
An extensive literature concerning contractual default rules exists in the
legal academic journals.' The fountainhead, of course, is the "Coase
Theorem," which holds that in a world of perfect information, economically
rational parties, competitive markets and zero transaction costs, default
rules are irrelevant in the sense that any clear rule will lead to the same
(efficient) allocation of resources so long as the parties remain free to
bargain around the rule." More broadly, and with both more and less
insight, Justice Brandeis observed that "in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."' 2
9. I do not know how frequently parties expressly provide for concurrent breach scenarios in their
contracts. Concurrent breach is a remote possibility that occurs in complex permutations that are
difficult to anticipate. I presume parties frequently do not incur the costs of negotiating and specifying
such contingencies. I do note that standard form government contracts do provide that intervening
breach by another contractor may excuse performance, a standard provision consistent with the rule this
Article advocates. For example, the standard federal default provision for a fixed price contract reads:
The Contractor's right to proceed shall not be terminated nor the Contractor charged with
damages under this clause, if-
(1) The delay in completing the work arises from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and
without the fault or negligence of the Contractor. Examples of such causes include (i) acts of
God or of the public enemy, (ii) acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual
capacity, (iii) acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the
Government ....
48 C.F.R. § 52.249-10(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
10. Recent legal scholarship in the area includes: Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liabiliy for Breach of Contract: The Rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 284 (1991); Jules L. Coleman et al., A
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 (1989); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic
Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.. 615 (1990); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 597 (1990); Symposium on Default Rules
and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1993) (articles by Professors Ayres,
Feinman, Burton, Patterson, Johnston, and Schwartz).
11. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-6 (1960). Professor
Lawson criticizes law-and-economics scholars for claiming to show "efficiency" when, at best, their
models demonstrate "social wealth maximization." Gary Lawson, Efficiency andlndividualism, 42 DUKE
L.J. 53, 78 (1992). I adopt the, perhaps imprecise, convention of using efficiency to mean social wealth
maximization. Wealth-maximizing solutions may not always be the most rational-or the most
just-from the point of view of either society or individuals. Nevertheless, in the commercial contract
arena I deal with, wealth maximizing is, in my view, almost always a relevant consideration, and often
decisive.
12. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (explaining that settled rules are especially
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All of the Coase Theorem's premises are, to some degree, counterfactual.
Accordingly, choosing good default rules does generally matter. Scholars
following on Coase's insight first focused on the highly unrealistic "zero
transaction costs" assumption. There is a significant body of work
attempting to formulate default rules that would have been agreed to by
most parties, on the assumption that such default rules mimic in most cases
the efficient result that the Theorem posits would have been achieved but
for transaction costs. 3
Later work questions whether the "hypothetical agreement" construct
always leads to the most efficient default rule. The Coase Theorem assumes
not only zero transaction costs, but also competitive markets, rational actors
and perfect information. Professors Ayres and Gertner have shown that
choosing a default rule based on hypothetical agreements of most parties
may not be efficient when information asymmetries and market power exist
(as to some degree they invariably do).14 Ayres and Gertner argue that
where systematic informational asymmetry and market power exist,
lawmakers should construct "information forcing" default rules that bring
us closer to the economists' perfect world, even when such rules would not
be those agreed to by most parties.15
important in areas of law affecting contract rights because of reliance interests).
13. See, e.g. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (4th ed. 1992); Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 10, at 89-90; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1433-34 (1989).
14. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 759-62 (1992); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 885-94 (1992); Johnston, supra note 10.
15. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 14, at 762-66 (using Hadley v. Baxendale as an example-shipper
and carrier would agree to an inefficient rule on recoverability of consequential damages if shipper had
private information and carrier had market power). Earlier work by Ayres and Gertner showed that
under certain circumstances lawmakers should select default rules that are easier to bargain around even
if they would not be the rules most parties would ultimately agree upon. Ayres & Gertner, supra note
10 In addition, scholars debate the distributional consequences of legal rules in a world of zero
transaction costs. Some deduce from the assumptions of the Coase Theorem that legal rules are not only
irrelevant to how resources are used, but also irrelevant to the distribution of wealth. RONALD H.
COASE, THE FiRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 170-73 (1988); George J. Stigler, Two Notes on the
Coase Theorem, 99 YALE L.J. 631, 632-633 (1989). A consensus, however, seems to have developed
that there may be some "wealth effect" associated with entitlements created by legal rules in favor of
the beneficiary of the rule. Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J.
LEGAL STuD. 223, 226 (1972); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism,"
99 YALE L.J. 611, 625-626 (1989). Under certain restrictive assumptions, the "wealth effect" may
preclude efficient bargaining around the default rule. Id. at 625-26. In cases involving contractual
presumptions, there ought (in theory) be no "wealth effect' to legal default rules because the entitlement
cannot preexist the mutual agreement of the parties. John J. Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River:
Incentive Schemes To Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549, 568 (1989). There is no
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In the abstract, in cases of concurrent breach I have no reason to assume
that one or another of the parties has greater market power or that
information asymmetries systematically favor defendants over plaintiffs, or
vice versa. And so I retreat to the position of advocating a clear rule
susceptible of judicial administration that in most cases generates efficient
results. To the extent that concurrent breach recurs in circumstances of
systematic informational asymmetry and market power, a different analysis,
sensitive to these factors, may be needed.
II. THE CONCURRENT BREACH PROBLEM
The facts and decision of California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship,
Inc."s provide a useful vehicle for discussing the problem of concurrent
breaches independently constituting sufficient but not necessary causes.1 7
C&H Sugar Co., a giant sugar cooperative owned by fourteen Hawaiian
sugar plantations, annually transported and refined roughly one million tons
of Hawaiian raw sugar cane. C&H harvested seventy percent of its cane
between April and October. Hawaiian refining and storage capacities were
sufficiently limited that a failure to promptly transport the crop to
California during this peak period would result in substantial portions of the
crop rotting in Hawaii.
apparent reason for the parties to mutually agree to redistribute wealth between themselves, and there
is no entitlement in this setting forcing such redistribution in the absence of agreement. An interesting
experiment involving mock collective bargaining among law students nevertheless found a statistically
significant wealth effect associated with contractual presumptions. Stewart Schwab, A Coasean
Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 254-56 (1988). Whether sophisticated
repeat players bargaining in the real world are similarly likely to "irrationally" agree to redistribute
wealth on the basis of contractual presumptions is unknown. Id. at 256. For my purposes, I assume no
wealth effect associated with the default rule under consideration in this Article.
16. 794 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986), amended and reh'g denied, 811 F.2d 1264, cert. denied, 484
U.S. 871 (1987).
17. Several other cases raise the "alternative cause" problem (of which concurrent breach is a
subset) in the context of the enforceability of liquidated damage clauses. The authorities divide upon
whether to view intervening causes such as another's breach as cutting off liability in such situations.
Compare Massman Constr. Co. v. City Council of Greenville, 147 F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1945)
(holding liquidated damage clause for delay in completion of bridge unenforceable on account of
neighboring state's failure to timely complete connecting road) and Northwest Fixture Co. v. Kilboure
& Clark Co., 128 F. 256, 261 (9th Cir. 1904) (holding liquidated damage clause unenforceable because
intervening bankruptcy would have resulted in loss attributed to breach) with Southwest Eng'g v. United
States, 341 F.2d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 1965) (enforcing liquidated damage clause against contractor even
though construction delays resulted in no actual damages) and Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137 F.2d 569, 571-
72 (3d Cir. 1943) (enforcing liquidated damage clause against supplier notwithstanding potential
intervening causes of delay) and McCarthy v. Tally, 297 P.2d 981 (Cal. 1956) (enforcing liquidated
damage clause notwithstanding no damages on account of seasonal closure of hotel).
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In 1979, C&H received notice from its principal carrier, Matson
Navigation Co., that Matson would terminate its shipping services effective
January 1981. Matson's withdrawal sent C&H scurrying to obtain
additional shipping capacity to handle the April-October 1981 harvest
period.
In late 1979, C&H entered into two contracts. Defendant Sun Ship Inc.
contracted to build a large oceangoing barge to C&H's specifications for
$25,405,000. Sun was to deliver the barge by June 30, 1981. Liquidated
damages for late delivery were set at $17,000 per day. Concurrently, Halter
Marine, Inc. contracted with C&H to build an oceangoing tug boat,
designed to be uniquely compatible with the Sun-built barge, for
$20,350,000. Halter was to deliver the tug by April 30, 1981 to Sun, where
under C&H's direction, the tug and barge would be integrated into one
oceangoing vessel capable of transporting C&H's sugar between Hawaii
and California on or before the June 30, 1981 deadline. The Halter contract
set liquidated damages for late delivery at $10,000 per day.
Neither Halter nor Sun performed on time. Sun's barge was completed
March 16, 1982. Halter's tug was completed July 15, 1982. C&H found
alternate shipping during the 1981 peak season and no sugar rotted, though
the court found that C&H incurred net expenses of roughly $368,000 in
making alternative arrangements. C&H nevertheless sought liquidated
damages from both contractors in the full amount stipulated in their
respective contracts. Halter settled; Sun litigated.
Sun argued that the liquidated damages provision was unenforceable as
a penalty. Sun's late delivery of the barge caused no harm because the
barge was useless without the specially designed tug that was not available
until after Sun in fact completed the barge. Relying on section 356 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Sun argued that because no loss in fact
occurred by reason of the breach, the liquidated damage provision was
unenforceable as a matter of law.
The Ninth Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law,"8 rejected Sun's position
and awarded C&H $4,403,000 in liquidated damages. The Ninth Circuit
recognized that Pennsylvania followed section 356 of the Restatement
(Second) in denying enforcement of liquidated damages clauses in
situations where, though the breach was a sufficient cause of the harm
suffered by the plaintiff, the harm would have been suffered in any case by
18 794 F.2d at 1434. Sun was a Pennsylvania corporation, and the contract provided for
construction by Pennsylvania law. Id.
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reason of sufficient independent causes." But the court held that this
doctrine was limited to situations where the defaulting contractor was alone
in its default. Otherwise, "the continued default of both parties would
operate to take each of them off the hook. That cannot be the law."2 The
court
conclude[d], therefore, that in this case of concurrent causation each
defaulting contractor is liable for the breach and for the substantial damages
which the joint breach occasions. Sun is a substantial cause of the damages
flowing from the lack of the integrated tug; Sun cannot be absolved by the
absence of the tug.21
I question the Ninth Circuit's liquidated damage analysis on a number
of levels. Traditionally (as the court acknowledged), there are two indepen-
dent bases for invalidating a liquidated damage clause: (1) the stipulated
damages are greatly disproportionate to ascertainable actual damages;' or
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b (1981) ("If, to take an extreme case,
it is clear that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum as damages is unenforce-
able."); id. § 356 illus. 4 (stating that liquidated damage clause is unenforceable where contractor's
delay in completing construction causes no harm in light of failure to obtain operating permit until after
construction complete). The Restatement view is not universally held. Cases divide on the enforceability
of liquidated damage clauses when there are no actual damages. For cases contrary to the Restatement,
see Southwest Eng'g Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 1965) (enforcing liquidated
damages clause on account of construction delays although no actual damages occasioned by delays);
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. City of Chicago, 350 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1965) (enforcing liquidated damages
clause in favor of project owner on account of subcontractor's delay although final project completed
on time); McCarthy v. Tally, 297 P.2d 981, 987 (Cal. 1956) (enforcing liquidated damage clause on
account of hotel closure although closure took place in off-season and resulted in no lost revenues). See
infra note 22.
20. 794 F.2d at 1437.
21. Id. at 1437-48.
22. Many question whether actual harm should be relevant to the validity of a liquidated damage
clause (although there is substantial authority so holding). Ian . Macneil, Power of Contract and
Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 504-09 (1962); Justin Sweet, Liquidated Damages in
California, 60 CAL. L. REV. 84, 138-39 (1972) ('[W]hen directly faced with the question, most
American courts will not knowingly enforce a liquidated damage clause where there is no actual
damage."). But see Southwest Eng'g Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 1965)
(enforcing liquidated damages clause notwithstanding injured party's stipulation that it suffered no
actual damages); Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.) (discussing
relevance of actual damages to validity of liquidated damage clause). Actual harm will almost always
vary, often substantially, from reasonable pre-estimates in situations where harm is by hypothesis
difficult to ascertain. CHARLEs T. McCommcC, DAMAGEs §§ 149-150 (1935). Both the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) and the Restatements of Contracts, though somewhat ambivalent, are
generally thought to codify the traditional position that actual harm as well as anticipated harm are
relevant in assessing the reasonableness of liquidated damage clauses. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1990);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 356 (1981) ("Damages for breach by any party may be
[VOL. 73:97
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/2
1995] LIABILITY FOR CONCURRENT BREACH OF CONTRACT
(2) the stipulated damages are not a reasonable pre-estimate of hard to
ascertain anticipated damages.' In C&H, the clause seems to fail both
grounds: on the face of it, the stipulated damages are greatly disproportion-
ate to the actual harm calculated by the Ninth Circuit,24 and they do not
seem to be a genuine pre-estimate of anticipated harm.'
liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual
loss ... "); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACS § 339 (1932). Neither authority expressly deals with the
troublesome problem of the clause that is reasonably related to anticipated harms that do not in fact
occur. Corbin's position is that "[t]he probable injury that the parties had reason to foresee is a fact that
largely determines the question whether they made a genuine pre-estimate of that injury; but the justice
and equity of enforcement depend also upon the amount of injury that has actually occurred." 5
CoRBIN, supra note 7, § 1063; see also 3 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REmEMimS § 12.9(l)-(5), at 245-70
(2d ed. 1993); Roy R. Anderson, Liquidated Damages Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 Sw.
L.J. 1083 (1988). The American Bar Association recommends amending the UCC to establish that
satisfaction of the reasonable estimate test alone is sufficient to support a liquidated damages clause.
An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990 Preliminary Report of the UCC Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J.
CoRp. L. 981, 1239-44 (1991).
23. 5 CORBIN, supra note 7, §§ 1059-1060 (1964); Macneil, supra note 22, at 501-04 (1962).
24. The Ninth Circuit evaded the great disproportionality issue through inapt reliance on
Clydebank Eng'g & Shipbuilding Co. v. Yzquierdo y Castaneda, 1905 App. Cas. 6 (H.L.). In
Clydebank, a British shipbuilder was found liable for liquidated damages on account of late delivery
of four destroyers to the Spanish Navy around the time of the Spanish-American War. The shipbuilder
objected that the clause was an unlawful penalty because Spain could not prove actual damages. The
House of Lords found that the shipbuilder's position as to Spain's damages unreasonably called for an
inquiry into the "whole administration of the Spanish Navy," id. at 11, an inquiry it refused to
undertake:
The loss sustained by a belligerent, or an intending belligerent, owing to a contractor's failure
to furnish timeously warships or munitions of war, does not admit of precise proof or
calculation; and it would be preposterous to expect that conflicting evidence of naval or
military experts should be taken as to the probable effect on the suppression of the rebellion
in Cuba or on the war with America of the defenders' delay in completing and delivering
those torpedo-boat destroyers.
Id. at 20. Because actual damages were, as anticipated, impossible to ascertain in fact, the House of
Lords upheld as reasonable the attempt to liquidate them in advance at 67,500 pounds sterling.
In C&H, however, there is nothing speculative about whether or not C&H's expectancy interest was
impaired by Sun's breach. Had Sun performed, C&H would have been in exactly the same position
of having to arrange alternate shipping for lack of a functional vessel. In C&H, though one might have
reasonably anticipated great difficulty in ascertaining damages, in fact the damages were readily
ascertainable and the actual amount was $0 (or perhaps as much as $368,000 in incidental damages as
calculated by the court), while the stipulated amount exceeded $4 million. 794 F.2d at 1438.
25. The Ninth Circuit claimed that the C&H clause was intended as a reasonable estimate of actual
harms to be suffered by nondelivery of the barge. 794 F.2d at 1438. This seems dubious given the
structure of the transaction. Nondelivery of either barge or tug could reasonably be expected to occasion
the same amount of harm. Either part appears to be useless without the other and substitutes were
equally unavailable in either case. Yet liquidated damages were fixed in one contract at $10,000 per day
and in the other at $17,000 per day. This suggests that C&H negotiated in each case for a clause calling
for a sufficiently high penalty in light of the value of each contract to secure timely performance
regardless of actual harm (an unlawful penalty clause), not to estimate and liquidate actual damages in
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I have nothing special to add to the abundant literature on the enforce-
ability of liquidated damage clauses, 26 nor do I wish to relitigate the C&H
court's decision on this issue on the facts of that case, notwithstanding my
doubts about the court's application of traditional liquidated damages
doctrine. As a broad policy matter, I agree with those who question
whether courts should police "penalty clauses" in commercial contracts,
negotiated between sophisticated parties of relatively equal bargaining
strength.27 Accordingly, even though I believe that the clause in C&H
operates as a penalty clause, not liquidated damages, as a policy matter, I
nevertheless agree with the Ninth Circuit's decision to enforce it.
More interesting, however, is the court's intuition,28 which I share, that
somehow, between Halter and Sun, C&H should be made whole, that each
firm's breach cannot excuse the other from liability for its own independent
breach. That intuition is, of course, entirely independent of the existence of
the liquidated damages clause. Assuming no such clause, the court would
still have to confront (and would presumably resolve in the same way) the
question of whether Halter's concurrent breach excused Sun from liability
for actual damages and vice versa. Unfortunately, the C&H court assumes
that the only solutions to the concurrent breach problem are an
advance (a valid liquidated damage clause). Of course, this is only one possibility suggested by the
structure of the transaction. Perhaps $17,000 per day is the reasonable estimate, the parties never
contemplated concurrent breach causing damages to accrue at $27,000 per day, and Halter bargained
for the $10,000 per day figure in its contract as a limitation on liability. Finally, the flat per diem nature
of the clause seems poorly calculated to serve as an estimate of actual damages given the seasonal
nature of C&H's business. Surely, damages could not reasonably be anticipated to accrue at the same
rate in June, the height of the shipping season, as in say December, when C&H did not need the vessel
to transport cane. Cf. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding minimum guarantee clause constitutes a penalty because formula is invariant to gravity of
breach: "it is apparent from the face of the contract that the damages provided for by the 'liquidated
damages' clause are grossly disproportionate to any probable loss and penalize some breaches much
more heavily than others regardless of relative cost').
26. See, e.g., 5 CORBN, supra note 7, §§ 1054-1075 (1964 & Supp. 1994); 3 DOBBS, supra note
22, § 12.9(l)-(5) (2d ed. 1993); Anderson, supra note 22; Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated
Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 351; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an
Enforcement Model and Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 554 (1977); Macneil, supra
note 22; Sweet, supra note 22.
27. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) ("On
this view the refusal to enforce penalty clauses is (at best) paternalistic-and it seems odd that courts
should display parental solicitude for large corporations.'); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 4.10 (4th ed. 1992); Clarkson et al., supra note 26; Goetz & Scott, supra note 26, at 592.
28. Intuition, not rationale. The court simply asserts that the contrary result "cannot be the law."
794 F.2d at 1437.
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unelaborated version of joint and several liability or no liability at all. This
is a false dichotomy.
Leaving all losses on the injured plaintiff by authorizing mutual
exculpation by the breachers is, I concede, unacceptable on basic fairness
grounds. The fact that there are two breachers, not one, is no reason to
leave the innocent plaintiff without any compensation. And permitting
mutual exculpation would encourage promisors under several interlocking
contracts to collude in breaching those contracts whenever disadvantageous,
even in circumstances where the gains from performance to the promisee
exceed the joint losses of the promisors-a highly inefficient result.
But the joint liability solution adopted by the court is not the only
alternative, nor is it the best available. The Ninth Circuit failed to think
through the implications of importing tort notions of joint liability for
concurrent breach of independent contracts. Joint liability raises trouble-
some issues that are mitigated by adopting rules of apportioned several
liability or by placing all liability on the more responsible party. After
elaborating and criticizing the joint liability solution adopted by the Ninth
Circuit, I suggest that placing all the liability on the more responsible party
is the best of a set of imperfect solutions, one that, incidently, also fits in
best with existing doctrine. I conclude by applying that solution to C&H
and to other concurrent breach cases at the end of this Article.
III. PRINCIPLES OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, CONTRIBUTION
AND CONCURRENT CAUSATION
C&H holds that in the situation of concurrent breach "each defaulting
contractor is liable for the breach and for the substantial damages which the
joint breach occasions." '29 This formulation raises many more questions
than it answers, questions that the Ninth Circuit was able to ignore because
of the fortuity of the liquidated damage clause.
Traditionally, contract law doctrine did not create joint liability for
independent breaches of separate contracts. Several contracts cases
29. ld
30. There are ancient joint and joint and several liability doctrines for co-obligors. At common
law, when two or more parties together promised a particular performance, they were co-obligors of but
one promise and jointly liable for breach. Promisees suing to enforce such a promise were subject to
significant substantive and procedural obstacles. Among the more onerous hurdles: joint obligors had
to be sued in a single action, release of one obligor released all, and the death ofajoint obligor released
his estate from any obligation. Most of these unfortunate consequences could be avoided by making
the obligation expressly "joint and several." Thus the rules for suing on a joint obligation became a
minor inconvenience for sophisticated promisees but a major trap for those who inadvertently omitted
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considering the matter (including all such cases before 1970) seem quite
definitely to reject the possibility.31
Tort law, on the other hand, has long-standing and elaborate doctrines of
joint and several liability. A' few modem contract cases,32 in addition to
C&H Sugar Co., have begun the process of borrowing joint and several
liability principles from tort law.3 But the borrowing has been done ad
hoc and without any sensitivity to the effect of these principles on
established contracts doctrine or the complexity of apportioning liability in
these circumstances.
For example, in a few construction cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has applied the "single injury rule" of tort law to concurrent breach of
contract cases and imposed joint and several liability. In Northern
Petrochemical Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc.,34 the plaintiff wished to
construct a manufacturing facility on its property. The architect, relying on
negligent structural engineering work, designed the building to follow the
the magic words.
Joint obligations are now deemed "joint and several" by statute in most American jurisdictions. With
respect to joint and several obligations, co-obligors may each individually be sued for the breach, and
each obligor ordinarily has rights to indemnity or contribution from its co-obligors. Modem suretyship
law and modem civil procedure have superseded most of the remaining common law baggage
surrounding joint and joint and several obligations. For extensive commentary and criticism concerning
the common law rules ofjoint and joint and several liability for co-obligors, see 4 CORBIN, supra note
7, §§ 923-941 (1964).
31. 5 CORBIN, supra note 7, § 999 n.21 (1964). Comparing tort joint and several liability, Corbin
writes: "In the contract field, however, if the acts of others whether wrongful or not are contributing
factors, those others are not thereby joined with the defendant as having committed the breach of
contract." Id. See L.R. Foy Constr. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., Civ. A. No. 86-2136, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2842, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 1988) (holding that there is no joint and several liability in
contract actions); Board of Educ. v. Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 517 N.E.2d 1360 (N.Y.
1987) (holding that there was no contribution between those who breach independent contracts and
cause unitary harm); Turfmasters, Inc. v. Tri-County Tree & Turf, Inc., No. 12166, 1991 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1143, at *7 (Mar. 21, 1991) (holding that there is no joint and several liability in contract
actions); Coke v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 258 N.W. 257, 258 (Mich. 1935) (same); Lithia
Lumber Co. v. Lamb, 443 P.2d 647, 649 (Or. 1968) (holding that there is no joint and several liability
in contract actions unless expressly or impliedly specified by the contract).
32. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
33. Professor Gilmore observed twenty years ago that "speaking descriptively, we might say that
what is happening is that 'contract' is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort."' GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CoNTRACr 87 (1974). Notwithstanding certain tendencies in this direction identified by
Gilmore (and others), his report of the death of contract seems to have been exaggerated. E. Allan
Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
203, 221-22 (1990) (arguing that "the liberal application of third party beneficiary doctrine actually
caused contract to invade tort"); Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued
Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1975).
34. 211 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Minn. 1973).
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contour of the land. The architect's design proved defective, in that a key
structural wall failed against lateral movement from the hill upon which the
building was constructed. Moreover, the general contractor improperly
prepared the site in compacting the fill and pouring the concrete pad. Both
the contractor's and the architect's failures to exercise reasonable care in
their work gave rise to what the Minnesota court characterized as
"negligent breaches of contractual obligations."35
The plaintiff undertook expensive rehabilitative work and the project was
substantially delayed by the failure of the structural wall and the need to
redo the contractor's site preparation work. Some of the additional work
was specifically attributed to site preparation and some to the failure of the
wall, but a portion of the rehabilitative work went to fix both defects.
Moreover, the delay damages were entirely indivisible, because, even had
the wall not failed, the need to recompact soils and repour concrete still
would have delayed the project, and vice versa. The Minnesota court,
relying entirely on tort authorities,36 imposed joint and several liability on
the architect and contractor.37
Later, the Minnesota Supreme Court felt compelled to clarify that
Northern Petrochemical had not created a new tor---"negligent breach
of contract"--but rather, had imported joint and several liability into
contracts doctrine in the case of joint breaches of independent contracts
combining to cause an indivisible harm, at least when the breaches are not
"intentional. 39 Minnesota has never established, however, exactly what
the rule of contribution amongst the breaching parties is, except to make
clear that in no case do comparative fault principles apply.4"
35. Id. at 167. This formulation seemed to anticipate the (much-criticized) California case J'Aire
Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) (finding tort liability for "negligent interference with
prospective business advantage" growing out of contractual relations). Subsequent California decisions
have sharply limited J'Aire. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (declining
to make tort remedies available for bad faith termination of employment contract); Seaman's Direct
Buying Svc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67 (Cal. 1984) (suggesting caution in extending
tort remedies to commercial contract context).
36. The Northern Petrochemical court relied principally on Matthews v. Mills, 178 N.W.2d 841
(Minn. 1970) (involving multiple automobile collisions) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433(b)(2) (1977) (listing considerations in determining whether negligent conduct "is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm.").
37. 211 N.W.2d at 167.
38. See supra note 35.
39. Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 102 & n.6 (Minn. 1983).
40. Id. at 101; see also Mike's Fixtures, Inc. v. Bombard's Access Floor Sys., 354 N.W.2d 837
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the Minnesota comparative fault statute does not apply to contract
cases).
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Similarly, the few other courts that impose joint and several liability for
breach of independent contracts have, in the absence of liquidated damage
clauses, naturally fallen into adopting tort principles of joint and several
liability in dealing with concurrent breach scenarios.'
Accordingly, one can predict that the Ninth Circuit would look to tort
law to give specific meaning to its rule of joint liability for concurrent
breach. A brief sketch of those doctrines, and their policy rationales and
implications, demonstrates that, however appropriate those doctrines may
be in tort law, they are poorly suited for incorporation into existing contract
law.
A. Joint and Several Liability
The following discussion relies heavily on Professors Kornhauser and
Revesz' recent work on joint and several liability settlement strategy.42
Under joint and several liability, the injured plaintiff may recover full
damages from each defendant found jointly and severally liable, subject to
the restriction that the plaintiff can only receive one satisfaction of its
judgment taking into account all collections from all defendants. Joint and
several liability generally applies in tort when different actors' negligence
combines to cause an "indivisible" harm.43
Holding each negligent actor liable for all the damages caused by all the
negligent actors substantively distinguishes joint and several liability from
several liability. Under several liability, each actor is liable for only its
proportionate share of the damages, usually its percentage fault. The
plaintiffs right to sue each tortfeasor separately, or not at all, or all
together, distinguishes joint and several liability procedurally from joint
41. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. M/V Bodena, 829 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1987) (relying on tort
authorities to impose joint and several liability for breach of freight forwarding and shipping contracts
requiring below-deck stowage of goods); cf. In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 364-65 (3d Cir.
1990) (imposing joint and several liability on breach of warranty and negligence claims).
42. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and SeveralLiability, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 427,435-44 (1993) [hereinafter Kornhauser & Revesz, Settlements]. Other related work
by Kornhauser & Revesz includes: Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J 831
(1989); Apportioning Damages Among Potentially Insolvent Actors, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 617 (1990); and
Sequential Decisions by a Single Tortfeasor, 20 J. LEGAL STuD. 363 (1991).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(2) (1977) (providing joint and several liability
where damages cannot be apportioned among two or more causes); see id. cmt. i ("Where two or more
causes combine to produce such a single result, incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis,
and each is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the courts have refused to make an arbitrary
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liability. Under joint liability, all the defendants must be sued together and
their liability adjudicated in one action.'
B. Contribution
The rule of joint and several liability is only the first step in allocating
tort liability. Joint and several liability gives the plaintiff discretion initially
to allocate liability among tortfeasors as plaintiff wishes. But the rule only
addresses the allocation question between plaintiff and the tortfeasors as a
class. Rules of contribution then must be worked out to allocate that
liability amongst the tortfeasors. Kornhauser and Revesz identify six
choices, all of which courts and legislatures make in different permutations
to produce various common law and statutory contribution schemes:
1) Contribution or no contribution.
2) How to apportion the liability (the "sharing rule").
3) How to account for settlements and collections (the "set-off rule').
4) Contribution rights retained by settling defendants.
5) Nonsettling parties' contribution rights against settling defendants.
6) Protections for nonsettling defendants against "sweetheart settlements."45
These choices are not completely independent of one another. Of course
if one allows liability to rest wherever the plaintiff chooses (i.e., "no
contribution"), no other choices are necessary.46 Moreover, although not
logically compelled, one would expect that the nature of protections
afforded nonsettlers varies with the nature of the set-off rule, the scope of
settlers' contribution rights, and nonsettlers' own contribution rights. Still,
many plausible permutations are possible, and, indeed, exist in various
jurisdictions and areas of substantive law.
Assuming some sort of contribution amongst defendants requires us to
consider whether: the sharing rule is by equal shares or by comparative
44. See supra note 30.
45. Kornhauser & Revesz, Settlements, supra note 42, at 432-33.
46. No contribution was the rule at common law. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101
Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799); Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. RIL, 196 U.S. 217 (1905). Since
South Carolina's 1988 adoption of the 1955 Revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
[hereinafter "UCATA'", S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993), apparently only
Alabama, albeit with "some exceptions," persists in the common law approach of no contribution. See
J.C. Bradford & Co. v. Calhoun, 612 So. 2d 396, 398 (Ala. 1992); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers' Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87 & nn.16-17 (1981) (50-state survey of contribution rules).
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fault;47 the set-off rule is pro tanto or by proportionate share;4  settling
defendants may be compelled to contribute to nonsettling d6fendants49 and
may demand contribution from nonsettling defendants; 0 nonsettling
defendants have procedural protections against settlements that unfairly
prejudice them."
All of these choices have important strategic implications that affect the
litigation and settlement strategies of both plaintiff and defendants.
Choosing wisely among the various alternatives requires a remarkably well-
developed intuition for game theory on the part of lawmakers and judges.
No "one size fits all" rule will minimize strategic behavior problems,
because the strategic implications change depending upon (among other
things) the relative size of transaction costs and the degree of correlation
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. h (1977); UCATA § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 63
(1975) (allowing for pro-rata contribution only); cf. UNIF. COMPARATrE FAULT ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A.
42 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter UCFA] (comparative contribution statute designed to replace UCATA in
comparative fault states).
48. Pro tanto set-offs reduce nonsettling defendants' liability by the amount of the settlement.
Proportionate share set-offs reduce nonsettling defendants' liability by the settling defendant's
proportionate share of the liability, as subsequently determined by the factfinder under either pro rata
or comparative fault rules. The proportionate share may be greater or less than the settlement amount,
depending on how favorable the negotiated settlement was. Both rules have their advocates: UCATA
§ 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975) (pro tanto rule); cf. UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 57 (Supp. 1994) (proportionate
share rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1977) (describing both rules but endorsing
neither).
49. Establishing the contribution rights ofnonsettling defendants against settling parties has proved
especially difficult. Three viable alternatives, each with serious drawbacks, contend (I) contribution
from all settling parties (settling defendant bears risk of disproportionately small settlement); (2) no
contribution from good faith settling parties subject to pro tanto set-off (nonsettling defendant bears risk
of disproportionately small settlement); (3) no contribution from good faith settling parties subject to
proportionate share set-off (plaintiff bears risk of disproportionately small settlement). At different
points the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have sought to codify each alternative. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts in apparent frustration at the lack of consensus refused to take a position.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, caveat & cmt. m(l)-(2) (1977). UCATA and the UCFA
provide for differing forms of contribution protection for the settling defendant. UCATA § 4(b), 12
U.L.A. 98 (1975); UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 57 (Supp. 1994).
50. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the UCATA, and the UCFA, a settling defendant can
seek contribution only if the plaintiff's claim against the other defendants is extinguished by the
settlement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. f (1977); UCATA § 1(d) (1955), 12
U.LA. 63 (1975); UCFA § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 54 (Supp. 1994). But see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (1988)
(authorizing contribution under CERCLA in favor of parties settling with the United States or a State
absent extinction of the claim). See infra note 125.
51. UCATA § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975) (requiring good faith); see also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 877 (West 1980) (imposing a good faith settlement procedure); N.Y. GEN. OBLIOATIONS LAW § 15-
108 (McKinney 1989) (same). But see supra note 49.
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of each defendant's liability with each other defendant's liability.52 And
of course no one has, and courts are unlikely to obtain, the empirical
information necessary to determine the appropriate choice.'
Kornhauser and Revesz' work suggests that such remarkable intuition is
rare. The most common joint liability regimes have perverse settlement
characteristics.54 In settlement negotiations, plaintiffs may be able to play
off defendants against one another to extract substantially more than the
expected value of the damage claim.55 Joint and several liability may
discourage settlements altogether or may encourage plaintiffs to settle
cheaply with the more culpable defendant and then litigate with the less
culpable.5 ' Even when the rules encourage settlement with all defendants,
more culpable defendants often fare better than less culpable ones. 7
Intuition is not altogether lacking, however, or perhaps experience has
laid bare some of the flaws of joint and several liability. Politically, joint
and several liability in tort is under attack as unjustly enriching plaintiffs
and more culpable defendants at the expense of less culpable defendants.
In California, traditional joint and several liability has been limited for pain
and suffering and similar types of damages. 8 Several states have partially
52. Komhauser & Revesz, Settlements, supra note 42, at 492-93; see also William L. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Torifeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 517 (1980).
53. Cf Kornhauser & Revesz, Settlements, supra note 42, at 492-93 (suggesting that administrative
agencies might be able to gather and analyze such data).
54. Kornhauser and Revesz assume that the majority common law rule allows contribution
allocated in proportional shares, and pro tanto set-off. Settling defendants are usually given settlement
protection, subject to good-faith hearings to protect nonsettling defendants from collusive or grossly
unfair settlements. Settling defendants ordinarily may not compel contribution from nonsettlers absent
extinction of the plaintiffs claim. 1d. at 447-48.
55. Id. at 448-57.
56. Sweetheart settlement with the more culpable party becomes the plaintiff's best strategy under
joint and several liability rules as the plaintiffs probabilities of success against each defendant approach
perfect correlation. Id. at 453-57. Korhauser & Revesz note that courts that criticize joint and several
liability with pro tanto set-offs on this ground appear to assume mistakenly that perfect correlation is
the general case. Id. at 490 & n.201 (critiquing Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7th Cir.
19S4)).
57. Kornhauser & Revesz, Settlements, supra note 42, at 447-57.
58. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West 1988) (Fair Responsibility Act of 1986). The California
Supreme Court has also created several-only tort liability in "mnarket-share" products liability cases.
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). Similar reforms have been enacted by such major
jurisdictions as Florida, Illinois, New York and Ohio. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3) (West 1987);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 735, para. 1117 (1991), as amended by Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995,
1995 111. Legis. Serv. 89-7 (West); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1600 (McKinney Supp. 1994); OHio REv.
CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1991).
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or wholly abolished joint and several liability by statute." Increasingly,
judges have raised similar concerns.60 In academic circles, a large body
of work criticizes joint and several liability, though of course not without
dissent and much qualification.6 The federal government is now poised
to enter the fray: the House of Representatives recently passed the Common
Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995. Section 202 of the
proposed legislation preempts state joint and several liability rules for
noneconomic harms in cases affecting interstate commerce.62
C. Concurrent Causation in Tort
Tort law also has grappled with the problem of allocating responsibility
among -multiple sufficient but not necessary causes.63 The classic example
59. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1989 & Supp.
1994); IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3) (1990); IND. CODE § 34-4-33-4 (1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d)
(1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-02 to 32-03.2-03 (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40
(1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1974 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988 & Supp.
1994). See also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (1994) (limiting defendant's joint and several liability to
twice the percentage of fault); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-15.1-.2 (Supp. 1994) (same); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (1972) (imposing joint and several liability only to the extent necessary for the
injured party to recover 50% of their damages, and several liability thereafter); IOWA CODE § 668.4
(1987) (imposing joint and several liability for defendants that are more than 50% responsible only);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2) (1993) (same).
60. See, eg., McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde & River Don Castings, Ltd., 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994)
(concerning contribution under maritime tort law); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employer Ins., 113 S.
Ct. 2085 (1993) (contribution under Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884
F.2d 1222, 1229-32 (9th Cir. 1989) (contribution under Securities Exchange Act of 1934), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 890 (1990); Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596, 599-601 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990) (same); Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7th Cir. 1984)
(contribution under ERISA); see also Korhauser & Revesz, Settlements, supra note 42, at 481-91
(discussing case law).
61. In addition to Kormhauser and Revesz, discussed extensively supra notes 42-57, academic
critics ofjoint and several liability include Landes & Posner, supra note 52, and Aaron D. Twerski, The
Joint Torfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1125
(1989). But see Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 (1988).
62. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202 & 401 (1995) (a bill to enact the Common Sense
Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995).
63. There is a huge academic literature dealing with causation problems in tort law. A sampling
includes: HART & HONORE, supra note 1, at 130-307; ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW
OF TORTS (1963); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. C-t. L. RE . 69 (1975); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of
Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980); Ernest J. Weinrib, A Step Forward in
Factual Causation, 38 MOD. L. REV. 518 (1975); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 1735 (1985); Symposium on Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 397 (1987)
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is that of two fires each sufficient to destroy particular property. If both
fires are negligently set and combine to destroy the property, the authorities
agree that joint and several liability is the appropriate solution.' If one
fire is negligently set and the other arises from an innocent cause, the older
authority seems to leave the loss on the plaintiff,65 while the more modem
cases (and the Restatement (Second) of Torts) hold the negligent party fully
liable for the property damage."
Defenders of joint and several liability for concurrent torts have relied
on four sets of arguments. First, as between an injured plaintiff and a
negligent defendant, neither of whom can be blamed for a co-defendant's
insolvency, justice requires that the insolvency risk be borne by the
defendant. 7 Second, the harm compensated for in tort-personal injury
primarily-ought to be systematically somewhat "overdeterred," since
money damages are highly imperfect compensation for such injuries. Third,
redistributive justice concerns systematically weigh in favor of fully
compensating tort victims. Fourth, tortfeasors are generally in a better
64. See Anderson v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45,49 (Minn. 1920); see also
Seckerson v. Sinclair 140 N.W. 239,244 (N.D. 1913); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 432(2) &
illus. 3 (1977).
65. Robert J. Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1934); see
Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 74 N.W. 561 (Wis. 1898).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) & illus. 4; see also Kingston v. Chicago & N.
W. Ry., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1926) (limiting Cook by allocating burden to defendant to prove
innocent origin of the other fire); Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 941,
943 (1935). Another classic alternative cause case is Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902), where
two motorcyclists concurrently passed a horse that, startled by the noise, threw its rider. Although the
noise from either motorcycle alone would have been sufficient to startle the horse the court held both
motorcyclists liable.
67. The introduction of comparative negligence doctrine into tort law weakens but arguably does
not destroy the power of this argument. Wright, supra note 61, at 1153-57. Professor Marc A. Franklin
observed in commenting upon this Article that the moral case for joint and several liability in tort
depends largely on insolvency risk allocation between an innocent plaintiff and culpable defendants.
Until the introduction of comparative negligence in the 1970s, all plaintiffs who established liability
were necessarily deemed to be legally not at fault. In such cases, joint and several liability (with or
without contribution) seems readily defensible on this "innocent plaintiff-culpable defendants" ground.
Comparative negligence allowed faulty plaintiffs to collect some portion of their damages as well. The
internal logic of comparative negligence is in serious tension with that ofjoint and several liability, for
in a comparative negligence case we must apportion the third-party insolvency risk between two
culpable parties. There is no obvious reason to prefer a culpable plaintiff to a culpable defendant. This
tension may account in large measure for recent retreats from joint and several liability. See supra notes
58-62 and accompanying text. A culpable plaintiff has little moral claim to collect from each defendant
more than that defendant's own proportionate share of the damages. Indeed until the introduction of
comparative negligence such a plaintiff had no claim at all. But recent reforms generally have not been
limited to cases involving culpable plaintiffs. Thus, interestingly, the expansion of liability in favor of
culpable plaintiffs through comparative negligence may have had the unintended consequence of
limiting innocent plaintiffs' common law rights against culpable defendants.
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position to spread losses than tort victims.68
Whether these considerations, individually or collectively, outweigh joint
and several liability's complex and sometimes perverse effects on litigation
and settlement strategy in the tort context is beyond the scope of this
Article.69 I do claim, however, that none of these rationales apply in the
context of concurrent breach of contract.
First, as for allocating insolvency risk, tort differs from contract. Tort
victims ordinarily do not choose their tortfeasors and cannot be said to have
voluntarily assumed the risk of any given tortfeasor's insolvency. Of
course, tortfeasors do not generally choose their co-defendants in advance
either. But as between an injured plaintiff and a negligent defendant,
neither of whom has bargained for the risk, it seems reasonable to many
courts and some commentators to allocate insolvency losses to the culpable
party.70
Parties to a contract, on the other hand, do choose one another. They
implicitly and necessarily assume the risk that the counterparty will not be
able to perform because of insolvency. As between a plaintiff who
voluntarily assumed the insolvency risk and a co-defendant who did not,
it seems reasonable to allocate the insolvency losses to the plaintiff.
Second, with respect to the nature of the harms, tort ordinarily addresses
personal injury.7' Courts traditionally have viewed property damage as
analogous to personal injury and allowed tort recovery for such harms.7
But courts have only reluctantly, and sporadically, compensated tort victims
68. Recent tort scholarship apparently agrees that modem tort law relies on loss distribution
rationales, but suggests such reliance is inappropriate. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1534-38 (1987) (describing loss distribution
objectives of modem tort law); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601,634-47 (1992) (critiquing Priest but admitting that courts were
driven to expand tort liability in part "because of [judges'] perception that those rules could achieve at
least a substantial measure of loss distribution").
69. A leading defender of the joint and several liability regime in tort is Professor Wright. See
Wright, supra note 61. Wright's view is critiqued in Twerski, supra note 61. For Wright's reply and
Twerski's rejoinder, see Richard W. Wright. Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1147 (1989); Aaron D. Twerski, The Baby Swallowed the Bathwater: A Rejoinder to Professor
Wright, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1161 (1989).
70. But see supra note 67.
71. See Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN
DIEGo L. Rev. 79, 80-83 (1986); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic
Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1985).
72. Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of
Products Liability, 23 SAN DmEmO L. REV. 37, 51-52 (1986); see, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403
P.2d 145, 152 (Cal. 1965) (holding property damage recoverable in strict products liability).
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for consequential economic loss unrelated to personal injuries.73
Taking personal injury as the core and property damage as the periphery
of the interests that tort protects leads naturally to generous compensation
of injured plaintiffs. Our law embodies the widely shared intuitions that
personal injury is a greater intrusion than physical destruction of an
individual's property and that property destruction is worse than "mere"
economic loss. 74 Joint and several liability in tort is consistent with this
bias since the interest being protected is freedom from personal injury or
property damage.
Contract law on the other hand, at its core, is about economic loss, not
personal injury or destruction of property. The basic contract remedy,
expectancy damages, awards the injured party the financial equivalent of
performance.' To the extent that one subscribes to the intuition that
compensating "mere" economic loss is less important than compensating
personal injury or the physical destruction of property, joint and several
liability is less appealing in contract than in tort.
As for redistributive justice, one can plausibly assert (at least in some
classes of cases) that tortfeasors (and their insurance carriers) are both
wealthier than the typical tort victim and in a better position to spread
73. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151 (prohibiting products liability recovery for mere economic losses); see
Abel, supra note 71, at 101-02 (citing numerous traditional examples of tort limitations on recovery of
economic losses); Rabin, supra note 71, at 1513, 1534 (noting "sustained reluctance of the courts to
extend liability for economic loss"). Attorney and accountant malpractice is one tort area where
economic loss predominates. But here courts have been especially leery of the ripple effects of
economic losses and the risks of disproportionate liability. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E.
441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) ("If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries may expose accountants to an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."); Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., 834 P.2d 745, 747 (Cal. 1992) (limiting auditors' liability to third parties for negligent
misrepresentations).
74. Sullivan v. Dunham, 55 N.E. 923, 924 (N.Y. 1900) ("The safety of the person is more sacred
than the safety of property.'); Seely, 403 P.2d at 152 (distinguishing between economic loss and
property damage); Employers Ins. v. Suwanee River Spa Lines, 866 F.2d 752, 763 (5th Cir. 1989) ("As
in East River [S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)] the damage alleged here
is purely economic. Thus the public policy concerns which underpin the imposition of a duty in
tort-the need to provide consumers with greater protections from personal injury and property damage
than is afforded by warranty or contract-are not implicated."); Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor
Co., 489 A2d 660, 672 (NJ. 1985) ("Generally speaking, tort principles, such as negligence, are better
suited for resolving claims involving unanticipated physical injury, particularly those arising out of an
accident. Contract principles, on the other hand, are generally more appropriate for determining claims
for consequential damages ... . '). This intuition is stronger and more universal and seems morally and
intellectually sounder as to personal injury than as between property damage and economic loss. Abel,
supra note 71.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981); 5 CORBIN, supra note 7, § 992 (1964);
E. ALLAN FARNswoTH, FARNswORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8 (2d ed. 1990).
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losses (although the prevalence and relatively low cost of first-party
insurance suggests otherwise).76 There is no reason to think this difference
in wealth and loss spreading capacity, even if it exists in tort cases,
systematically favors defendants in commercial contract litigation.
D. Concurrent Causation in Contract
Contract law generally fails to struggle explicitly with issues of
causation." Indeed, the claim that the defendant is ordinarily responsible
for the harm caused by its breach is highly imprecise.
Take a simple case: Seller (S) agrees to sell one widget to Buyer (B) for
$1, delivery to B in 30 days; the market price increases to $3 by the
delivery date; S fails to deliver. Without question, B's contract damages are
$2, but it is quite inaccurate to say that S caused B to suffer $2 in harm.
In the first place, the "harm" is to assumed prospective economic
advantage; B has not suffered actual property losses or personal injuries. B
is probably in no worse position than it was before entering the contract,
and B is only possibly worse off compared to how it might have been had
the breach not occurred.78 In calculating the damages, B is not required
to show that the widget actually would have been resold for $3 or that B
actually paid $3 to acquire another widget.
Secondly, the contract allocates risks of losses that neither party
"causes." Assuming a competitive market structure, no act or omission of
either S or B affects the market price of widgets. But by agreeing to a fixed
price forward contract, S assumes the risk of an increase in market price
and B of a decline. Much more central to contract law than identifying who
or what caused the harm is identifying which party assumed the risk of the
harm.
Finally, courts are much more likely to limit liability for indirect or
"consequential" harms in contract cases even when causation is clear. Even
if B can show that S's failure to make prompt delivery of the widget
caused a plant shutdown or property losses from fire or whatever, S is not
responsible in contract even though such indirect damages might well be
considered within the scope of "proximate cause" if they resulted from
76. GumO CALABREsi, THE CoSTS OF AccmEmS (1970); Schwartz, supra note 68, at 689-99
(1992) (explaining courts' current retreat from expanding tort liability in part as the result of thejudicial
and academic realization that defendants may not be the superior loss spreaders they were once thought
to be).
77. HART & HONORF, supra note 1, at 308.
78. Measured at the moment of breach, B does lose a $2 profit. But looking only at the moment
of breach may be artificial. When the dust finally settles, based on future events and their impact on
the widget market, S's breach may prove to have been the best thing that could have happened to B.
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tortious conduct. Recoverable damages, it is said, are limited to those
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.
These various considerations get melded into the question of "causation,"
the resolution of which is determined by the "substantial factor" analysis:
In all cases involving problems of causation... the plaintiff's total injury
may have been the result of many factors in addition to the defendant's tort
or breach of contract. . . . In order to establish liability the plaintiff must
show that the defendant's breach was "a substantial factor? in causing the
injury.79
Given the marginality of causal concepts in determining the scope of
contract damages, it is no surprise that little doctrine concerns compensa-
tion for harms caused by concurrent breaches of contract. What little
doctrine there is suggests that the liability of each party is determined
independently of the other."0 Even in C&H, notwithstanding the court's
rhetoric concerning joint liability, Sun's liability is ultimately fixed by
reference to the terms of the Sun contract alone.
IV. THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY SOLUTION
A. Analysis of Joint and Several Liability in Concurrent Breach
I have already suggested many of the flaws with a joint liability
approach to cases involving concurrent breach of contract. To collect and
supplement those points here:
1. Complexity
Joint and several liability implies elaborating a complex body of law
dealing with the nature and amount of contribution rights. The task is
difficult and the doctrine would have to be built up from scratch because
no preexisting contracts doctrine or applicable statute exists, and the tort
rules are both uncertain and vary substantially across the United States.81
79. 5 COffIN, supra note 7, § 999; see also William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. Continental
Baking Co., 942 F.2d 1332, 133940 (9th Cir. 1991); Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir.
1943); Nelson v. Lake Canal Co., 644 P.2d 55, 59 (Colo. 1981); Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp.,
235 Cal. Rptr. 813, 820 (Ct. App. 1987); Reiman Assoc. Inc. v. R/A Advertising Inc., 322,306 N.W.2d
292, 301 (Wis. 1981).
80. 5 CORarN, supra note 7, § 999 & n.21 (comparing tort joint and several liability to contract
rules); supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. But cf supra notes 5, 34-41 and accompanying text
(discussing cases that extend tort joint and several liability to contract).
81. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
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Thus, it is by no means clear how to choose a workable scheme, or indeed
that any scheme would produce efficient results. Questions that arise from
the facts of C&Hprovide examples of the difficulty and complexity of the
task: How should liability be apportioned between Halter and Sun? Are
each jointly and severally liable for the $27,000 per day in liquidated
damages? Should their liability be allocated by comparative fault or pro
rata shares? Should their percentage fault be multiplied by the aggregate
liquidated damages or only the damages each party agreed to? Would
Halter as settling defendant have a right of contribution against Sun? Could
Sun demand contribution from Halter if Halter's settlement were less than
its proportionate liability under whatever allocation rule were chosen? Does
Halter's settlement reduce Sun's liability by either Halter's proportionate
share or pro tanto? These questions have no easy or obvious answers.
2. Strategic Behavior
Joint liability in many factual settings leads to strategic behavior that
complicates the settlement and litigation of cases and tends to favor
plaintiffs and more culpable defendants and to disadvantage less culpable
defendants.82 To illustrate on a highly stylized version of the C&H facts,
assume (i) no liquidated damages; (ii) no transaction or litigation costs; (iii)
an aggregate harm of $100; (iv) a 50% probability of C&H prevailing
against Halter and Sun; (v) if C&H prevails, Halter's proportionate share
is 70%; (vi) if C&H prevails, Sun's proportionate share is 30%; (vii)
C&H's probability of prevailing against Halter is perfectly correlated with
C&H's probability of prevailing against Sun; (viii) judgments against both
defendants are fully collectible; and (ix) settlements are accounted for by
pro tanto set-offs.
In the absence of joint and several liability, the case should settle for
$50, the expected value of the claim. With joint and several liability, C&H
should be able to induce Halter to settle for $35 (70% of $50, the expected
82. Litigation and settlement realities in particular cases may swamp the theoretical strategic
incentives discussed in this section. For example, a plaintiff may prefer to litigate against a more
culpable party rather than the less culpable even in circumstances where settlement with the more
culpable party should otherwise create a surplus, because a jury may assess more generous
compensatory or even punitive damages against such a party or be more likely to find liability. Or very
high litigation costs might induce settlements even in circumstances where joint and several liability
should discourage settlement. Possibly perverse strategic incentives, therefore, are only one
consideration in determining whether to adopt joint and several liability, and are not decisive in and of
themselves. Nevertheless, the peculiar incentives and distortions created by joint and several liability
should be taken into account in assessing whether to extend the doctrine.
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value of the claim). Sun now faces a claim with an expected value of
$32.50 (50% chance of being responsible for the remaining $65). C&H
therefore, should be able to extract an aggregate of up to $67.50 from both
defendants by strategically playing them off against one another, a strategy
that works most directly against Sun, the less culpable of the two parties."
The Kornhauser and Revesz analysis suggests that this problem is greater
when the defendants' liabilities are correlated and less to the extent their
liabilities are independent."4 The degree of correlation depends on the
particular facts of each case, but it is reasonable to assume that liability of
parties under interrelated but independent contracts would rarely be
perfectly correlated or perfectly independent.
On the other hand, as the liabilities of the parties approach perfect
independence, joint and several liability can discourage settlement
altogether. Assume that (i) C&H suffers $100 in damages; (ii) Halter has
a 40% probability of prevailing against C&H; (iii) Sun has a 60%
probability of prevailing against C&H; (iv) if both Sun and Halter are
liable, each is responsible for 50% of the damages; (v) if only one
defendant is liable, it is responsible for 100% of the damages; (vi) the 40%
and 60% probabilities are perfectly independent; (vii) no transaction or
litigation costs; (viii) judgments against both defendants are fully collect-
ible; and (ix) settlements are accounted for by proportionate share set-offs.
Under these assumptions, in litigation C&H has a 24% probability of no
award and a 76% probability of winning $100 from either or both
defendants for an aggregate expected value of $76. Halter in litigation has
a 40% chance of no damages, a 24% chance of $50, and a 36% chance of
$100, for an aggregate expected liability of $48. Sun in litigation has a
60% chance of no damages, a 24% chance of $50, and 16% chance of
$100, for an aggregate expected liability of $28.
Settlement should not occur on these facts. Suppose C&H attempts to
settle first with Sun. In settlement, given its expected liability, Sun will
settle for up to $28. This leaves C&H with a 60% probability of winning
$50 from Halter, or an expected value of only $30. C&H can realize only
$58 in settlement by settling first with Sun. Since C&H expects $76 from
litigation, C&H will not settle. Assume alternatively that C&H attempts to
settle first with Halter. In settlement, given its expected liability, Halter will
settle for up to $48. This leaves C&H with a 40% probability of winning
83. Settling first with Sun is an inferior strategy. C&H could extract only (i) $15 from Sun (30%
of S50) and (ii) $42.50 from Halter (501/ of $85), for a total of $57.50.
84. Komhauser & Revesz, Settlements, supra note 42, at 453-57.
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$50 from Sun, or an expected value of only $20. C&H can realize only $68
by settling first with Halter. Again, C&H can not realize as much in
settlement as it expects in litigation.8"
Kormhauser and Revesz show that this settlement-discouraging effect of
joint and several liability is more pronounced as (i) transaction and
litigation costs decline; (ii) the disparity in the probabilities of plaintiff
prevailing against the various defendants increases; and (iii) the correlation
of those probabilities decreases.8 6
3. Tort Rationales Inapplicable
Traditional factors that cause courts to create generous compensation
principles from the point of view of plaintiffs in tort do not apply in
contract. Tort concerns itself primarily with personal injury and secondarily
with property damage. Contract concerns itself primarily with economic
harms. Tort plaintiffs ordinarily do not choose their tortfeasors and so it
seems unjust to lay the risk of one defendant's insolvency on the plaintiff.
Contract plaintiffs do choose the parties with whom they contract and the
risk of insolvency is necessarily assumed when the relationship is created.
Unlike in tort, in contract there is no particular reason to assume that
asymmetries in wealth and loss spreading capacity systematically favor
defendants.87 Taking our exemplary case, C&H, (i) the harm is economic,
not personal injury or property damage; (ii) C&H, the plaintiff, is likely to
have undertaken a credit analysis of Halter and Sun before entering into the
contracts and would have been imprudent not to have done so; and (iii)
C&H is large and wealthy and in a position to insure against and spread
losses as well as mitigate them.
4. Inefficiency
Joint and several liability creates perverse economic incentives, also well
illustrated by C&H. Imagine the likely scenario that Sun knows that Halter
will be late, and that there will be no tug until July 1982. Under the court's
decision, Sun nevertheless must complete a useless barge on time,
presumably at greater cost, or suffer liquidated damages at the rate of
85. This settlement-discouraging effect would be mitigated but not eliminated if apro tanto set-off
rule applied. Under such a rule, C&H on these assumptions could extract up to $71.20 in settlements
by settling first with Halter. (The upper bound would be $68.80 if C&H settled first with Sun.) In either
event, the expected settlement value is still less than the $76 C&H expects from litigation.
86. Id. at 449-53.
87. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
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$17,000 per day. Rushing to complete the barge on time may disrupt
production schedules for other ships, require overtime and additional
materials costs, and cause other economic losses. Sun should bear such
costs only to the extent that C&H receives a gain from prompt performance
that exceeds the amount of such losses. Imposing such costs on Sun
without any gain to C&H creates economic waste. 8
5. Inconsistency with Traditional Remedial Limits
Joint liability is inconsistent with such basic contract principles as the
expectancy measure of damages and the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale."9
Expectancy damages are measured by the scope of the promise being
enforced." The remedy for breach, i.e., the expectancy, will vary depend-
ing on the nature of the specific promise. Independent contracts with
separate promises may create very different expectancies. Indeed, C&H
illustrates the problem nicely. Although the harm C&H suffered was
unitary, the liquidated damages under the Sun contract were $17,000 per
day while the liquidated damages under the Halter agreement were $10,000
per day and each firm promised different completion dates.
With respect to Hadley, the settled law is that liability is fixed by
reference to that which is in the fair contemplation of the parties at the time
of contracting as the likely harm from breach.9' What might have been
within the fair contemplation of one jointly and severally liable party might
not have been within the contemplation of the other. Accordingly,
allocating responsibility for consequential damages raises issues in contract
88. Professor Anderson notes the potential for windfall gains in favor of C&H Sugar Co. under
the Ninth Circuit's ruling. Anderson, supra note 22, at 1097 (criticizing C&f-). The windfall gain is
incident to inefficient imposition of cumulative liquidated damage remedies in excess of actual damages
in cases of concurrent breach. This windfall gain seems symptomatic of the underlying efficiency
problem.
89. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
90. Justice Holmes wrote:
When a man makes a contract, he incurs, by force of the law, a liability to damages, unless
a certain promised event comes to pass. But unlike the case of torts, as the contract is by
mutual consent, the parties themselves, expressly or by implication, fix the rule by which the
damages are to be measured.
Globe Refining v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540,543 (1902). See generally FARNSWORTH, supra
note 75, § 12.1.
91. 5 CORBIN, supra note 7, §§ 1007-1008 (discussing Hadley). No contract case has engendered
more commentary than Hadley v. Baxendale. Some recent examples: Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REv. 563 (1992); Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 10;
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J.
LacAL STuD. 105, 138 (1989).
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that simply do not arise in tort. Are we to apportion the liability based on
each jointly liable party's liability for such damages under Hadley, a
complex and novel inquiry? Or are we to sacrifice the Hadley rule on the
altar of joint and several liability as well?
B. Joint and Several Liability Is Not a Workable Solution to
Concurrent Breach Cases
In sum, working out a regime of joint liability for concurrent breaches
is a complex task. The reasons that justify the joint and several liability
regime in tort in general do not apply in contract. But the disadvantages of
overdeterrence and strategic behavior that give rise to criticism of the tort
regime arise in contract as well. Importing the tort notions would create
perverse economic incentives on prebreach behavior. And finally, such
notions appear to be inconsistent with long-standing, well-understood and
apparently well-functioning contract doctrines governing remedies. For
these reasons, I find it relatively easy to reject joint and several liability as
a solution to C&ff, or, more generally, to the problem of concurrent breach
of contract.
V. THE APPORTIONED LIABILITY ALTERNATIVE
An obvious alternative to the flawed joint and several liability solution
is several liability. Several states, and more recently the Congress,
responding to the perceived flaws of joint and several liability rules, have
moved in this direction in the tort area.92 With respect to concurrent
breaches, one might allocate percentages of liability to particular defen-
dants, calculating damages by reference to each defendant's individual
agreement, multiplying the damage number by the appropriate percentage,
and entering judgment for that amount.
Such a rule would render contribution rules unnecessary and would
eliminate most of the strategic behavior associated with joint and several
liability. Since each defendant would be responsible only for its percentage
of damages as calculated in accordance with the terms of its contract, each
defendant's expected liability on the plaintiff's claim should be independent
of other defendants' litigation or settlement decisions. But apportioned
liability has disadvantages of its own.
For one thing, as with joint and several liability, apportioned liability is
complex and difficult to administer judicially. Determining that there has
92. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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been a breach is comparatively easy. Assigning specific percentages of
liability to multiple breaches that join together to cause a unitary harm is
on its face an enterprise of dubious validity and great complexity. The
bases for determining such an apportionment are entirely nonobvious and
would undoubtedly require false precision in the weighing of
uncommensurable factors. Assigning degrees of comparative fault in tort
has of course become commonplace,93 over similar objections." But the
task here would involve assigning precise percentages of responsibility
against strictly liable parties, not assigning comparative fault, and would
require simultaneous computations of multiple damage figures under
various contracts. It is difficult enough for juries to apply the expectancy
damage measure and Hadley v. Baxendale. Demanding that they juggle
such doctrines among multiple defendants and calculate varying percentages
of liability is to invite arbitrariness and inconsistency.
Secondly, it is unclear how one ought to apply an apportioned liability
rule in one context where concurrent breach tends to get litigat-
ed-liquidated damages cases. Assume Sun is deemed 40% responsible for
nondelivery of the complete tug-barge. C&H is entitled to aggregate
liquidated damages of $27,000 per day-17,000 per day under the Sun
contract and $10,000 per day under the Halter contract. Should the
judgment against Sun be for $17,000 per day (the liquidated amount under
its contract), $10,800 per day (40% of the total amount of liquidated
damages), or $6800 per day (40% of the liquidated amount under its
contract)? On the one hand, liquidated damage clauses are meant to
pretermit a damage calculation and allow courts to simply assess the
liquidated amount upon a finding of liability. On the other hand, there is
little point to undertaking a complex apportionment of liability if damages
are to be simply the stipulated amount, not apportioned between the
parties.95 And courts have apportioned liquidated damage amounts in other
93. Comparative fault has (overwhelmingly) been the majority American rule since the mid-1970s.
See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE Li. 697,
697-98 (1978).
94. Compare, e.g., WILLuAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 438 (4th
ed. 1971) (suggesting that administrative problems of apportioning fault were insuperable) and Richard
A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29 (1972) with Schwartz, supra note 93 (arguing
that upon reappraisal, comparative negligence is superior to contributory negligence).
95. Of course if, as seems entirely sensible (and entirely inconsistent with the case law, see supra
note 27 and accompanying text) one were to abandon the penalty doctrine, then one could simply assess
the liquidated amount upon a finding of breach without more. The problem occurs only when the
penalty doctrine and C&H joint liability coexist.
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contexts.
9 6
Thirdly, such a rule would create the risk of inconsistent verdicts. Liberal
modem joinder rules make separate proceedings unlikely. Jurisdictional
problems and inconsistent forum selection clauses in different contracts,
however, could force plaintiffs to proceed in multiple actions. One can have
little confidence that any two factfinders will assign consistent percentages
of fault.
Finally, the efficiency problem with joint and several liability rules in the
concurrent breach context is mitigated but not eliminated." Again using
a stylized version of the C&H facts as a foil, assume Sun knows of Halter's
breach and can perform but only at high cost. Even taking the apportioned
liability rule to hold Sun responsible only for a reduced damage award
based on the factfinder's ex post assessment of its percentage of responsi-
bility,98 so long as the expected damage award exceeds the increased cost
of performance, Sun will be induced to incur additional costs that will not
benefit C&H in light of Halter's concurrent default.
VI. THE ONE-PARTY RULE
I suggest that holding only one concurrent breacher responsible for all
the damages as calculated in accordance with its contract, and excusing the
others, is superior to both joint and several liability and several liability as
a solution to the problem of allocating liability for concurrent breaches.
This rule rests easily with well-established doctrines in contracts relating
to supervening causes and remedies. Moreover, this "one-party" rule is
more judicially administrable and has fewer perverse side effects than the
alternatives. It amounts to a rough and imperfect justice, but justice
nevertheless.9 9 Moreover, this rule generally permits efficient breaches to
96. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1026, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977)
(apportioning liquidated damages), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); Aetna Casualty & Stir. Co. v.
Butte-Meade Sanitary Water Dist., 500 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.D. 1980) (apportioning damages among
bonding company, contractor and owner); Nomellini Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Water Resources, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 682, 685 (Ct. App. 1971) (apportioning fault under liquidated damages clause in public works
contract); Baldwin v. National Safe Depository Corp., 697 P.2d 587 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)
(apportioning liquidated damages under lease notwithstanding breaches by both lessor and lessee and
"entire" (i.e., unapportioned) rent clause).
97. See supra text accompanying note 88.
98. That is, assume the court does not simply assess the liquidated amount in the Sun contract
upon a finding of unexcused nonperformance by Sun whatever its relative responsibility. See supra note
95.
99. On the soundness of a "rough justice" approach to tort law, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality In
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occur without further negotiation or litigation costs. t° Finally, by taking
into account the gravity, timing and reasons for contractual defaults, the
one-party rule minimizes opportunities for destructive forms of strategic
behavior."'
A. Describing the One-Party Rule
As a general matter, I do not think it possible to specify in advance a
bright-line rule for determining which of several breaching parties ought to
bear responsibility for the damages resulting from concurrent breach. As in
determining comparative fault in tort, specific facts and context are
crucial." 2 Possibly decisive factors would include:
1) The timing of the breaches. A prior breach in a related contract may
render subsequent performance by a second party futile or even harmful. The
first breaching party is (other things being equal) more responsible.
[This analysis] suggests that legal economists de-emphasize their efforts to fine-tune liability
rules in order to achieve perfect deterrence. Given the imprecision in the processes by which
tort liability affects behavior, these efforts at fine-tuning, though intellectually challenging,
are likely to be socially irrelevant.
100. The theory of efficient breach, rooted in the Holmesian notion that a contract creates no more
than an option in the promisor to perform or pay damages, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 234 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) (1881), has fallen in and out of favor with law-and-
economics analysts. Compare POSNER, supra note 13, at 128-30 with Daniel Friedman, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989) (critiquing efficient breach theory). Certainly existing legal
rules, if not sound economic analysis, seem to encourage "efficient breaches." Even critics of efficient
breach theory acknowledge that the theory is most plausible in scenarios like C&H where compelled
performance may result in social waste as well as lost profits for the promisor. Friedman, supra, at 8-13.
101. Professor Grady, building on tort cases involving fires set by sparks from passing trains, has
focused on framing liability rules that are sensitive to the timing of acts of negligence and contributory
negligence when strategic behavior is likely. See Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic
Behavor: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1988). Grady plausibly suggests
that in most tort cases strategic behavior is scarce because the victim's acts or omissions are not
apparent to the injurer, and vice versa, until time to strategically modify one's behavior is short. Id. at
31-40. Multiple interlocking contracts, however, offer opportunities for strategic behavior, as parties are
likely to know of and have time to react to third party defaults even if they cannot control them.
Grady's analysis suggests that in such contexts close attention to the timing and sequence of parties'
acts is important to achieving efficient results. Id.
102. Professor Wright explains:
When there is more than one responsible cause of a particular injury, the comparative
responsibility of each cause depends on a number of factors: the level of the risk that was
created, the objective foreseeability and reasonableness of the risk, the actual awareness of
the risk, the 'remoteness' of the causal connection between the risk and the injury, and the
policies that underlie the various categories of tortious behavior. These factors govern the
determination of comparative responsibility, not according to any detailed formula but rather
through rational common sense judgment ....
Wright, supra note 61, at 1144-45.
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2) The relative gravity of the breaches in terms of how substantial the defect
in performance is. The party committing the greater breach is more
responsible.
3) The relative size and value of the contracts. The party to the larger
contract is more responsible.
4) The relative culpability of the breachers. The willful or bad faith breacher
is more responsible than the negligent one who in turn is more responsible
than the innocent one.1 3
5) The relative harm-avoidance costs of the parties. Liability for damages is
more appropriately placed on the defendant positioned to avoid, or mitigate,
plaintiff's damages at least cost.
6) Each defendant's savings from breach. The greater a particular
defendant's relative savings from nonperformance, the more efficient and just
it is to impose the full liability for damages upon it. The party most
benefiting from nonperformance ought to bear the cost of nonperformance.
The weight to be placed on these factors must vary with context. In
many circumstances, sequence may be critical."° Where defendants' cost
savings associated with nonperformance are ascertainable and diverge
widely, this factor is apt to be decisive for it allocates benefits and burdens
to the same party. In other cases, great disproportion in the relative size of
the contracts or the gravity of the breaches or the culpability of the
breaching parties or harm-avoidance costs may dictate that the liability be
imposed on a particular party.
Multifactor balancing tests with shifting and undetermined weights on the
factors are not self-executing. Determining which is the more responsible
party in a particular case may not be obvious. Nevertheless, such tests are
characteristic of the common law and far more complex balances have been
103. Great caution must be used in relying on this factor. Efficient breaches are necessarily and
appropriately deliberate. Nevertheless, where the efficiency implications are not clear it may be
appropriate to take into account the mental state of the breacher in apportioning liability. Doctrines of
bad faith breach and material breach presently incorporate such a factor. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct
Buying Svc., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (imposing tort liability for bad faith
denial of existence of contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 241-242 (1981) (factors
relating to materiality include the extent to which breaching party departs from standards of good faith).
104. Tort scholarship has increasingly focused on the importance of sequence and timing in shaping
efficient liability rules. See George B. Assaf, The Shape of Reaction Functions and the Efficiency of
Liability Rules: A Correction, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal
Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1986) (examining "doctrinal choices that contain
within them an implicit choice of proper temporal dimensions'); Grady, supra note 101; Steven Shavell,
Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J.L. & ECON. 589 (1983).
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routinely drawn by judges and juries for centuries." 5 Such tests are
particularly well suited to an infrequently litigated problem that arises in
highly variant situations. Concurrent breach is such an area. I will not
anticipate here the many possible permutations of concurrent breach
resulting in a unitary harm that even my limited imagination can conjure
up. As such cases arise they can be resolved in accordance with these
principles as these principles take color and texture from the particular
facts.
One recurring fact pattern, however, involves multiple unexcused delays
under interlocking construction contracts. In this context, the sequence of
the breaches, relative cost savings and the relative length of the delays
should generally be decisive. If the overall project's completion is
inevitably delayed by one party's late performance, to that extent
subsequent contractors ought be excused from wasteful timely performance.
When performances are sequential, the party that first causes the inevitable
delay is the responsible party. With respect to concurrent performances, the
party that delays most is the responsible party. By so placing the liability,
all parties are generally encouraged to complete their work on the most
efficient basis given their knowledge of the status of the scheduled
completion of interlocking performances and their incremental completion
costs for prompt performance. Where the relative cost savings of the
defendants diverge significantly this factor ought to be taken into account.
Misplacing liability on a party with only modest savings from nonperfor-
mance may result in socially wasteful performance."°
After describing how the one-party rule fits in the framework of existing
doctrine and some of its policy implications, I conclude by applying the
rule to a variety of fact situations suggested in the case law.
105. A few random examples include: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 241-242 (1981)
(material breach); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Fumiture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(unconscionability); Penn Centr. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (regulatory
takings); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (punitive damages under Alabama
law); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (fair use of copyrighted material); see also Christopher R. Leslie,
Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense To Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CAL.
L. PEv. 243, 286 (1993) ("In cutting through gray areas, bright line rules necessarily entail some over-
and under-inclusion. Efficient behavior is inevitably deterred and sometimes punished. Bright line tests
are merely rules of convenience which remove judges' discretion. Moreover, while line drawing is
difficult and complex, courts engage in balancing all the time; that is what judges are supposed to do.")
(citations omitted).
106. See infra note 123.
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B. Doctrinal Framework
1. Supervening Causes
Impossibility, impracticability, frustration of purpose, and mistake are,
under a variety of circumstances, grounds for relief from contractual
obligation."0 7 Section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
provides:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render
that performance is discharged, unless the language or circumstances indicate
the contrary.0
Certain events such as death, 09 acts of God, war, revolution, destruc-
tion of the subject matter of the contract, ° and intervening government
action prohibiting performance... are commonly considered events "the
non-occurrence of which" are assumed by the parties. The common law
approach is to determine whether there is a reason to allocate the risk of
such an event to one party or the other. Perhaps the risk is expressly
107. Good overviews of the excuse doctrines include: JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS §§ 112-116 (3d ed. 1990); GILMORE, supra note 33, at 35-90 (1974); 6 CORBIN, supra note
7, §§ 1320-1372. The leading American case in this area is probably still Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v.
United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (costly detour around Cape of Good Hope because of
closure of Suez Canal by war no excuse for carrier). The ancient English rule gave little scope for
excuse. Parradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647) (invasion and occupation of lands
by Prince Rupert did not excuse tenant's obligation to pay rent). By the mid-nineteenth century, the
English courts had retreated from this strict position. Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep.
309 (LCB. 1863) (destruction of music hall by fire excuses obligation to rent hall). Doctrines of excuse
were expanded beyond physical impossibility of performance to frustration of purpose in the celebrated
coronation cases. Krell v. Henry, 2 YB. 740 (C.A. 1903); Chandler v. Webster, 1 L.B. 493 (1904).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). Similarly, with respect to the
obligations under sale of goods contracts, the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery... is not a breach of [seller's] duty under a contract for sale
if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by
compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic government regulation or order
whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1990); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981) (regarding
discharge by supervening frustration).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 262 (1981).
110. Id. § 263.
111. Id.§ 264.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/2
LIABILITY FOR CONCURRENT BREACH OF CONTRACT
allocated in the contract itself. If not, perhaps custom or ordinary rules of
contract interpretation would impliedly place the risk on one or another
party. " 2 Absent express or implied assignment of the risk by contract,
courts may determine that one or another of the parties created the risk or
could have avoided the risk and is therefore "at fault,"'1 3 or is a superior
risk bearer for some other reason." 4 In the absence of any such bases for
allocating the risk, the common law," 5 with rare exceptions, 1 6 treats
such supervening events as simply terminating the remaining obligations of
the contract. "7
2. Anticipatory Repudiation
Related doctrine deals with the problem of fixing a remedy in cases of
anticipatory breach or repudiation. If events transpire after repudiation but
before final judgment that would have excused performance or lessened
damages had there been no repudiation, then such events are taken into
consideration in calculating damages. The leading statement of the
principle, as in so many areas, is that of Judge Learned Hand:
It is, indeed, one of the consequences of the doctrine of anticipatory breach
that, if damages are assessed before the time of performance has expired, the
court must take the chance of forecasting the future as best it can. That does
112, Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981), performance is excused by
the supervening event "unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary."
113. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981), excuse is available only
when "a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault' (emphasis added). See also 6
COR.BIN, supra note 7, § 1329; Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 179 N.E. 383,
384 (N.Y. 1932) (Cardozo, CJ.) (no excuse where "[defendant] has wholly failed to relieve itself of the
imputation of contributory faulf').
114. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (assigning risk of
costly detour to carrier rather than shipper); see also Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83
(1977).
115. Civil law systems are much more willing to adjust the obligations of contracts on account of
unforeseen supervening events. RENE DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAW: A COMPARISON IN
SUBSTANCE 120-22 (1980).
116. The most celebrated exception is Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), where a federal district court reformed the price terms of a long-term aluminum
supply agreement in light of vast increases in energy prices.
117. See Andrew Kull, Mistake Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43
HASTINGS LJ. 1 (1991) (arguing that "a wide range of cases arising in the various contexts of mutual
mistake and frustration suggests that the characteristic response of [common law] courts is to confirm
the parties in statu quo, granting relief to neither."); see also Oneal v. Colton Consol. School Dist. No.
306, 557 P.2d 11, 13 (Wash. CL App. 1976) (finding teacher's supervening illness excuses both
teacher's obligation to teach and school board's obligation to pay salary and benefits).
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not mean that it will ignore what has happened, when the period of
performance has already expired. Damages never do more than restore the
injured party to the position he would have been in, had the promisor
performed; this is not a rule peculiar to anticipatory breach, though that is an
instance. Hence it is always an answer, in that or other similar situations, to
show that, had the contract continued, the promisee would not have been
entitled to the performance, though he was apparently so entitled when the
promisor disabled himself or repudiated."'
The principle that damages can be limited by subsequent supervening
events is obviously related to the doctrine of excuse by supervening event.
For example, in Model Vending, Inc. v. Stanisci,"9 the plaintiff leased
vending machines to a bowling alley operator. The bowling alley operator
breached the lease. The court found that the plaintiff's damages for lost
rentals were limited to rentals that accrued up until the subsequent
destruction of the bowling alley by fire. Had there been no breach,
undoubtedly, the court on these same facts would have found the fire a
supervening event that excused the bowling alley from further performance.
Thus a supervening event that would have provided defendant an excuse
for nonperformance becomes a limitation on plaintiff's remedy for breach.
An additional wrinkle bringing us closer to the C&H situation is added
by a case such as Massman Construction Co. v. City Council of
Greenville.2' In Massman, the Fifth Circuit held that damages for delay
in construction of a bridge were not available because of the failure of a
118. New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Trans. Corp., 34 F.2d 653, 654 (2d Cir. 1929). The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts similarly provides:
Effect of Subsequent Events on Duty to Pay Damages
(1) A party's duty to pay damages for total breach by repudiation is discharged if it appears after
the breach that there would have been a total failure by the injured party to perform his return
promise.
(2) A party's duty to pay damages for total breach by repudiation is discharged if it appears after
the breach that the duty that he repudiated would have been discharged by impracticability or
frustration before any breach by non-performance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 254 (1981). Other commonly cited authorities for this
principle include: Hodes v. Hoffman Int'l Corp., 280 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (deeming seller's
bankruptcy a supervening event limiting breaching buyer's damages); Fratelli Pantanella, S.A. v. Int'l
Commercial Corp., 89 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (holding that government denial of export license
constituted supervening event excusing seller from damages for seller's prior repudiation); Hochster v.
De La Tour, 2 Ellis & BI. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853). But see Papaioannou v. Scirocco
Supper Club, Inc., 349 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. App. Term 1973) (refusing to reduce employee's
damage award for wrongful breach of employment contract on account of employee's supervening
disability on ground that "no man shall take advantage of his own wrong").
119. 180 A.2d 393 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962).
120. 147 F.2d 925, 927 (5th Cir. 1945).,
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state government to timely complete an adjoining road. Here the superven-
ing event, failure of the state to complete the road, while outside the
control of both parties, directly burdened the plaintiff, yet the court held the
event limited the defendant's liability for damages.
C. Doctrinal Analysis of the One-Party Rule
The "one-party rule" for allocating liability for concurrent breaches of
contract is not controlled by the impossibility or repudiation cases. In C&H,
for example, I should not be understood to suggest that Sun's obligations
under its contract are terminated by the intervening breach of Halter as the
doctrines of excuse generally provide or that Sun's delays amount to a
repudiation of its obligations. Nevertheless, the "one-party rule" can reside
comfortably within this set of doctrines. With respect to each defendant,
courts can continue to apply the "substantial factor" test for determining
liability and measure the scope of liability with reference to each individual
contract. It is only a small step further (and in no way inconsistent with the
case law) to hold that another party's unexcused breach of contract may be
an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the parties
and the occurrence of which operates to frustrate the principal purpose of
the contract and limit the damages available on account of breach.
In the absence of express conditions in the contract, ordinarily the parties
assume that contractually bound third parties will render the interlocking
performances essential to achieve the purposes of the contract. Absent
special circumstances suggesting otherwise, it is fair to assign the risk of
unanticipated third-party breach of another essential contract to promisee
rather than promisor. Promisee, not promisor, after all is the party who
formed the contractual arrangement with the third party. Nor (again, absent
special circumstances) is there any reason to attribute fault or superior risk
bearing or risk avoidance to either party with respect to a third-party
breach. 2' Accordingly, the doctrine excusing breach on account of
supervening event seems to extend easily to cover such situations.
The only special gloss is the sharp definition of that contingency so as
to avoid the specter of mutual exculpation. Frustration arising by another's
breach should only be recognized when the other party's breach is more
serious than that of the defendant asserting excuse. Because excuse is
121 6 CORBIN, supra note 7, § 1329 at 346 ("[Impossibility] does not excuse a promisor from his
contractual duty if he himself wilfully brought it about, or if he could have foreseen and avoided it by
the exercise of reasonable diligence and efficiency."); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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available only to the party with the lesser breach, mutual exculpation and
resulting failure to compensate is not available.
Even this special gloss is consistent with supervening event doctrine,
which in determining whether excuse should be available places heavy
emphasis on the magnitude of the change in circumstances and the
centrality of the assumed nonoccurrence of the putative supervening event
to the contractual relationship."
D. Policy Analysis of the One-Party Rule
1. Avoids Flaws of Joint Liability
The one-party rule avoids most of the pitfalls of joint liability. Complex
rules of contribution do not need to be worked out. The complex strategic
implications ofjoint liability rules become moot. The one-party rule allows
courts to enforce traditional remedial limitations on contract recovery.
Because each defendant's liability is bottomed only on its own contract,
ordinary expectancy damages, subject to the well-understood and well-
developed certainty, foreseeability and mitigation doctrines, are readily
applicable.
Moreover, the one-party rule lessens the risk of economic waste
associated with compelling performance that will be of no value to the
plaintiff because of the other defendant's breach. In fixing liability on the
party who commits the graver breach, both parties are given a proper
incentive to perform, or, at least, to commit the lesser rather than the
greater breach.
To return a moment to C&H, if Sun and Halter are both running late in
completing their respective segments of the tug-barge, the whole liability
will lie on the party who finishes last. Under this scenario, at no point does
either party have an incentive (other than the unobjectionable one of cost
savings that exceed C&H's damages) to engage in harmful delay, as the
costs of all delay will be visited upon the firm that delays most. On the
other hand, neither party has any incentive to engage in costly but futile
122. MURRAY, supra note 107, § 112 at 641-42 (3d ed. 1990). Professor Corbin wrote:
As a general rule, every contractor must carry the risk of frustration of his hopes and
expectations when subsequent events cause a decline in value of that for which he bargained.
... In a comparatively small number of cases, it has been held that a contractor does not
carry the risk of a catastrophic collapse of value. In such case it is found that the contractor
did not in fact assume the risk and that the circumstances are so extraordinary that justice
requires that he should not be compelled to carry it.
6 Co.BIN, supra note 7, § 1328.
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timely performance. Because each firm is strongly motivated to finish first,
prompt-as-commercially-practicable performance, but not waste, is
encouraged.":
2. Full Compensation
Furthermore, under the one-party rule, the plaintiff will receive full
compensation from the party committing the more serious breach, subject
only to an insolvency risk that plaintiff had full opportunity to evaluate in
advance and accepted. And the defendant committing the more serious
breach hardly has cause to complain, even if its breach is only slightly
greater. After all, this defendant is only being compelled to pay damages
that are the natural and foreseeable consequence of its own unexcused
failure to perform. It is only being denied the windfall of excuse to which
it had no entitlement.
3. A Few Pifalls
The one-party rule does require that a court evaluate the comparative
responsibility of the defendants and judge which party ought to be held
liable and which excused. While I acknowledge that this is not a trivial
burden, it is far less complex than the task we commonly assign to tort
juries of assessing comparative faults of plaintiff and defendants. The one-
party rule demands a simple election of which defendant is the most
responsible, not the assignment of specific percentages of liability amongst
all the parties. I note further that, at least in construction delay cases, the
question of which party delayed more seems readily susceptible of judicial
123. An important qualification to this analysis is the special case where the aggregate of Sun and
Halter's savings from late performance exceeds C&H's damages, but neither party's savings alone
exceeds C&H's damages discounted by the probability of that defendant being held liable. Put another
way, the objective of minimizing total social costs may require breach, but each defendant's internal
profit maximization function may require performance if that defendant bears all damages and the
damages exceed the cost of performance to it. The efficient rule under these circumstances allocates
damages in proportion to each defendant's cost savings. In the imagined world of zero transaction costs
the two defendants would bargain around the one-party rule and achieve the efficient result by jointly
breaching and sharing the damages. Indeed the clarity and stringency of the one-party rule may facilitate
such Coasean bargains even in the special case where the one-party rule fails to achieve efficient results.
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. Moreover, cost
savings from delayed performance are apt to be difficult to determine in many cases. Since such
allocation is unnecessary to achieve efficient results in most cases, may introduce perverse economic
incentives in others, and is generally cumbersome to administer, I do not suggest that it should be the
general procedure. See discussion of hypothetical apportioned liability rule supra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, if a court is confronted with a clear example of this special case,
allocation by cost savings is a plausible response.
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determination.
A further complication is accounting for prior settlements. If plaintiff
settles first with the more responsible party and then loses the litigation
against the less responsible party, obviously plaintiff receives no more than
the settlement amount. If plaintiff settles with the less responsible party and
then prevails against the more responsible party, can it collect the full
amount of his damages and retain the prior settlement also? 24 Or are the
damages reduced by the amount of the settlement? Because the one-party
rule is based on the presumption that all the liability should rest on the
more responsible party, I suggest that judgment should be rendered only for
the reduced amount and the settling defendant should retain a right of
reimbursement or indemnification against the more responsible party. Such
a rule might carry the added benefit of encouraging settlements, if a good
faith settling defendant could obtain protection from indemnification claims
that a losing litigant could not. But this result, while generally consistent
'with the rights of settling defendants with rights of indemnity in tort,125
and supported by the logic of the one-party rule itself, is not supported by
124. The court in L. R. Foy Constr. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., Civ. A. No. 86-2136,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2842 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 1988), allowed a partial pro tanto set-off in this
situation, notwithstanding its application of the traditional rule of no joint and several liability in
contract cases.
125. Such a rule would be consistent with older doctrines of tort-indemnity, pursuant to which
courts permitted one joint tortfeasor to recover monies paid to the plaintiff on account ofjoint injury
from another more culpable joint tortfeasor, without first extinguishing the plaintiff's claim completely.
Compare RsTATEmNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B (1977) (indemnity) with id. § 886A (contribution).
Judge Learned Hand wrote:
Such cases may perhaps be accounted for as lenient exceptions to the doctrine that there can
be no contribution between joint tortfeasors, for indemnity is only an extreme form of
contribution. When both are liable to the same person for a single joint wrong, and
contribution stricijuris is impossible, the temptation is strong if the faults differ greatly in
gravity, to throw the whole loss on the more guilty of the two.
Slattery v. Marra Bros. Inc., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951). The
introduction of contribution and comparative fault has greatly reduced the importance of tort indemnity.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B cmts. I & m (1977) (forecasting the decline of
indemnity doctrines). The one-party rule advocated in this Article, however, revives the forces driving
the development of tort-indemnity in concurrent breach cases.
Although contribution in favor of settling parties is generally unavailable in tort absent extinction
of plaintiff's claim, id. § 886A(2) & cmt. f, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), in an apparent effort to foster settlements, permits settling parties to retain
contribution rights against other "potentially responsible parties."' 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3)(B) (1988).
Consistent with the text of the statute, some courts have limited the scope of this provision to
settlements that involve a government party. See, e.g., Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of




1995] LIABILITY FOR CONCURRENT BREACH OF CONTRACT
contract precedent, and there may be difficulties in administering such a
rule and accounting for settlements.
Of course the one-party rule has other negative features as well. For
example, what of the case of two defendants between whom the factfinder
cannot determine which is more responsible? I assume by the lack of
reported cases raising this scenario that it is an unlikely one, that concurrent
breach causing a unitary harm is rare enough, and that when it happens one
can usually assign greater responsibility to one or another party. Certainly
when the nature of the breach is delayed performance rather than
nonperformance it should generally be possible to compare the amount of
delay occasioned by each party. But in the rare instance where it is not
possible, liability apportioned equally seems the most plausible alternative
consistent with the goal of compensating injured plaintiffs and deterring
breach.126
The one-party rule also raises a possibility of inconsistent verdicts. Under
modern permissive joinder rules and third-party defendant practice, 27 it
should usually be possible to adjudicate all the parties' rights and liabilities
in a single proceeding. In those cases where it is not (as, for example,
where the contracts have inconsistent forum selection clauses), a plaintiff s
judgment obtained under the one-party rule in one proceeding should
preclude plaintiff from collecting against a second defendant in a later
proceeding.12 Plaintiff, however, would bear the risk in proceeding
separately of losing both times on inconsistent findings with respect to
which defendant is more responsible. Plaintiffs, of course, can largely
prevent this outcome by proceeding against all defendants in a single
action, but this may not always be feasible.
Finally, while the one-party rule reduces opportunities for strategic
behavior compared to joint and several liability or a rule permitting mutual
exculpation of defendants, it does not eliminate such opportunities. If a
126. Compare the discussion of Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Suwanee River Spa Lines, Inc.,
866 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1989), infra text accompanying notes 136-37.
127. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h) (joinder of additional parties), 14 (third party practice), 18
(joinder of claims and remedies), 19 (joinder of persons needed for just adjudication), 20 (permissive
joinder of parties), & 21 (misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties) (1994).
128. This should be true simply as a matter of contract damage theory. If plaintiff has already been
fully compensated for its harm, it cannot show damages in its claim against the second defendant. Even
if this were not so, presumably courts would not (and should not) permit plaintiff double recoveries
obtained through inconsistent litigation positions, either through application of collateral estoppel
doctrines, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMEMS § 29 (1982), and FLEMiNG JAMES, JR. ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.25 (4th ed. 1992), or through equitable judicial estoppel principles.
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judgment against one of the defendants is less collectible (given insolvency
or jurisdictional or practical collection problems), collusion among litigants
is a risk.
One possibility is for defendants to collude in placing the liability on the
"weaker" defendant. Since the plaintiffs judgment against the weaker
defendant is worth less, if the more responsible stronger defendant can
somehow compensate the weaker defendant in a way that is invisible to or
uncontrollable by the legal system, it might induce the weaker defendant
to "take a dive." This scenario raises difficult coordination problems. A
device must be found for compensating the weaker defendant for allowing
judgment to be taken against it. Of course, the plaintiff has every incentive
to resist this strategy, and there can be no guarantee among the defendants
that the litigation against the stronger defendant will not result in a
plaintiffs judgment in any event. Moreover, the strategy can easily
backfire. If the collusion is detected, the stronger defendant is setting itself
up for possible "bad-faith" tort claims.
A more likely scenario is for the plaintiff and the weaker defendant to
collude in placing the liability on the less responsible stronger defendant.
Coordination is easier here, for the plaintiff can effectively guarantee the
weaker defendant that, if it cooperates, the plaintiff will not take judgment
against it. And we do observe such alliances taking place in tort litigation,
especially where there is joint and several liability. Of course, given the
winner-take-all aspect of the one-party rule, there is less incentive to
engage in this behavior than under joint and several liability. Plaintiff runs
a serious risk of losing in the litigation against the stronger defendant if
plaintiff must prove not only that the stronger party breached the contract,
but also that as between it and the weaker defendant, it was more
responsible for the plaintiff s harm. Accordingly, plaintiff might well
receive no more than its "sweetheart settlement" from the weaker
defendant. As the relative responsibility of the stronger party and the
collection risk associated with the weaker party increase, this strategy may
nevertheless become attractive.
While the one-party rule is therefore flawed, its flaws appear to manifest
themselves only in particular variants of an already unusual problem. The
flaws of the alternatives, joint and several liability, apportioned liability,
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VII. CONCLUSION: APPLYING THE ONE-PARTY RULE
I conclude by showing how I might apply the one-party rule to a variety
of stylized fact situations drawn from selected concurrent breach cases.
These hypothetical applications of the rule are provided only to illustrate
how one might go about ascertaining which of several defendants is the
responsible one. I wish to emphasize that I have not done an in-depth study
of the records of the cases from which these hypotheticals are drawn. These
cases were not litigated with the one-party rule in mind and so the records
are likely insufficiently developed to reach a definitive conclusion in any
event. Although I realize that other factors may be relevant (or even
decisive) in particular cases, I limit the analysis here to the following
factors:129
1. The timing of the breaches.
2. The relative gravity of the breaches.
3. The relative size of the contracts.
4. The relative culpability of the breaching parties.
5. The relative harm avoidance costs of the parties.
6. The relative cost savings of the breaching parties from nonperfor-
mance.
A. C&H Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc.'
30
The facts of this case are set forth above.'31 Halter is the more respon-
sible party. Halter's performance was due first and so its lateness
constituted the first breach. Not only did Halter breach first, but also it was
responsible for the longer delay, ultimately not completing its work until
three months after Sun had finished. Halter's longer delay suggests that
prompt performance would have been more burdensome for it and that,
therefore, it realized greater savings from delay. The two contracts were of
comparable size and there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of either
defendant or any reason to suspect that either defendant could have avoided
the plaintiff's harm without the other's performance. Holding Sun liable in
this case creates perverse economic incentives. Assume Sun knows of
Halter's breach, and that there will be no tug until July 1982. Unless
129. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
130. 794 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986), amended and reh'g denied, 811 F.2d 1264, cert. denied, 484
U.S. 871 (1987).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21.
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excused, Sun nevertheless must complete a useless barge on time,
presumably at significantly increased cost, or suffer liquidated damages at
the rate of $17,000 per day. Rushing to complete the barge on time may
mean disruption of production schedules for other ships, overtime and
additional materials costs, and other economic losses. Sun should be forced
by its promise to bear such costs only to the extent that C&H receives a
gain from prompt performance that exceeds the amount of such losses. To
impose such costs on Sun without any resulting gain to C&H amounts to
economic waste.
B. Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc.'32
The facts of this case are set out above.13 1 The architect's failure to
perform its design contract in workmanlike manner occurred first and
predestined expensive rehabilitative work. The magnitude of the defects in
performance by both architect and contractor appear equally substantial in
light of each party's contractual obligation. The contracts are of equal scope
but the value of the services under the construction contract were likely
greater than under the architect's agreement. Neither breach appears to have
been deliberate or malicious nor does either breach seem calculated to
capture specific cost savings. Both parties were in a position to minimize
further harm by noting the defects in the other's performance in a timely
fashion, but neither party did so. The architect had explicit supervisory
obligations over the contractor, but not vice versa. Under these circum-
stances it seems most plausible to find the architect the more responsible
party.
C. Alabama Football, Inc. v. Greenwood'34
L.C. Greenwood, a professional football player, signed a three-year
employment contract with the Birmingham franchise of the World Football
League. Both the team and the league were start-up enterprises with serious
financial problems, though those of the Birmingham team manifested
themselves more quickly. After Birmingham's first season, suppliers began
pressuring the team, and the league terminated the franchise agreement,
wrongfully in the team's view. Greenwood then repudiated his obligations
under his employment agreement and continued working for the NFL's
132. 211 N.W. 2d 159 (Minn. 1973).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
134. 452 F. Supp. 1191 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
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Pittsburgh Steelers. The combination of the team's weak financial
condition, its suppliers' actions, the league's termination of the franchise
agreement, and Greenwood's repudiation resulted in the Birmingham team's
failure as a business.
The league's prior breach of the franchise agreement should provide an
excuse for Greenwood's repudiation. The timing of the breaches suggests
that the most efficient course was for Mr. Greenwood to repudiate.
Certainly compelling Mr. Greenwood to sit out the coming football season
on the chance that the Birmingham team might survive the league's
purported termination seems socially wasteful. While both breaches
amounted to total breaches in the sense that both the league and Mr.
Greenwood expressed an intention to permanently withhold all future
performances on substantially unperformed agreements, the franchise
agreement was more central to the enterprise and of substantially larger
scope and value. Moreover, the league seems likely to be in a position to
minimize the harm to the team; Mr. Greenwood could only minimize the
harm to himself by obtaining alternative employment. The league may have
realized cost savings by terminating the Birmingham franchise; Greenwood
did not.
D. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. M/V Bodena 35
The plaintiff, Ingersoll Milling, manufactured in the United States
specialized industrial equipment valued at $2 million for a motor-car
company in Korea, Hyundai International, Inc. J.E. Bernard & Co. served
as the freight forwarding agent for the equipment; Taiwan International
Line, Ltd., the time-charterer of the MIV Bodena, was the carrier.
Taiwan International orally agreed with Ingersoll Milling to ship the
equipment stowed below deck. Bernard agreed to handle the documentation
for the shipment on behalf of Ingersoll Milling, including the obtaining of
"clean" bills of lading. Taiwan International breached its oral agreement by
stowing the Ingersoll Milling cargo on deck. Bernard breached its
obligation to obtain clean bills of lading by accepting bills from Taiwan
International noting "on deck" stowage. The cargo was seriously damaged
en route to Korea by exposure to the elements resulting from on-deck
stowage.
Taiwan International is the more responsible party here. The scope and
nature of the performance Taiwan owed Ingersoll was much greater and
135. 829 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1987).
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more directly responsible for Ingersoll's harm than Bernard's ministerial
role. Subsequent to the concurrent breaches, only Taiwan, not Bernard,
could have mitigated Ingersoll's damages by taking measures in transit to
protect the goods from storm damage. Although Bernard might have had
a last chance to prevent the harm by properly inspecting and rejecting the
nonconforming bills, the facts suggested that the boat had (literally) already
sailed. Bernard's breach seems entirely inadvertent, Taiwan's knowing and
deliberate and perhaps calculated to achieve specific cost savings by
increasing the vessel's carrying capacity.
E. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Suwanee River Spa Lines,
Inc. 3
6
I include this case brief, lest I be accused of avoiding the possibility of
difficult applications of the one-party rule. The Oxy Producer was an
integrated tug-barge freighter designed for Occidental Petroleum Corpora-
tion for the purpose of hauling superphosphoric acid to the Soviet Union.
The tug-barge sank in high seas off the Azores when the linkage between
the tug and barge failed. The trial court found that the cause of the failure
was improper mating of the vessels. Hvide Shipping, Inc. was the
supervisor of the design and construction of the vessel; Avondale
Shipyards, Inc., the shipbuilder. Avondale performed the improper mating
under the supervision of Hvide.
Both firms were expert and heavily engaged in this major project. Either
could have and should have spotted the flaw. Both apparently acted
inadvertently rather than consciously seeking cost savings. And there seems
little basis for asserting that efficiency concerns are best met by placing the
liability on one party or the other. Custom in the industry does not seem
to allocate the responsibility specifically to one of the parties. Perhaps if the
parties had litigated the case with the one-party rule in mind, facts would
have been developed to suggest which firm was more responsible. But on
the face of the appellate opinion, the most plausible response to this case
may well be to simply allocate responsibility fifty-fifty. 37
VIII. AN AFTERWORD
I hope to have persuaded you that another's "more responsible"
intervening breach of contract ought to cut off liability for breach of
136. 866 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1989).
137. See supra text accompanying note 126.
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contract, rather than result in joint and several liability for both breaching
parties. I will burden you now with two larger observations this work has
suggested to me, without attempting to prove or even affirm my own
unqualified belief in them.
First, one can rely on and incrementally expand doctrine to reach
sensible results. I do not find it merely incidental to my argument that the
body of impracticability doctrine developed in the contract case law leads
to a result that at least in my view is superior on a policy basis to the result
generated by borrowing of doctrine developed in case law outside contracts.
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV." '138 But in thinking through what rule of
law makes sense under the circumstances, due consideration of long-
standing doctrine developed in the area is almost always valuable and
sometimes sufficient to lead one to the correct result.
Second, the line between contract and tort remains meaningful, largely
because of the different nature of the harms each body of law addresses.
The differences between economic harms and personal injuries call for
different remedial schemes. If so, the unification of contract and tort law
into the general theory of civil liability once envisioned and predicted by
Professor Gilmore,'39 has, thankfully, eluded us.
138. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
187 (1920).
139. See supra note 33.
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